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SUPPLEMENTAL ADDENDUM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KANE, STATE OF UTAH

MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,
Civil NO. 940600003

vs.
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.;
MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL DENOYER;
RONALD R. SMITH; DONALD
SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES 1 through
5 and JANE DOES 1 through 5,
Defendants.

(Condensed Transcript)
* * *

DEPOSITION OF: LINDA RAE HOLLANDER
TAKEN ON:

May 21, 1997

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
PO BOX 1534
ST GEORGE, UTAH 84771
(801)674-1283

2079

LINDA RAE KOLLANDER
26

28

1

A. Yes.

1 after the sale of the company, probably in - in probably

2

Q.

2

Did that also decrease over time? That is, her

3 visits to the office?
4
5
6
7
8
9

I 3

A. Yes.
Q.

Did the tension between Marc and Ron continue

after the sale?
Q.

Would you characterize it as getting worse,

Do you remember anything else about the

substance of those conversations with Mr. Smith about the

5

poor relationship he had with Marc Smith?

7

better or about the same?

Q.

4
I 6

A. Yes.

the first or second year.

A.

It also caused a very poor relationship with the

other - with his family, of course - with his brothers

8

and sisters. K — it destroyed his family relationship

9

with the rest of his family.

10

A.

I would say probably a little worse.

10

Q.

And why do you feel that way?

11

Q.

Okay. And how was it that this worsening of the

11

A.

It was because they felt that Ron had not

12 tension manifested itself to you? What things did you

12 treated Marc fairly, I guess, in the sale of the company.

13 notice -

13

14

14 fairly in - in terms of the sale of the company?

A.

Ron started coming into the office less. When

Q.
A.

Did you feel that Ron had not treated Marc

15 he did come in, Ron - Marc would either - he would get up

15

16 and leave.

16 company. I can't say that - and I don't - and as far as

I - he let everyone know he was selling the

17

Q.

Did it manifest itself in any other ways to you?

17 I knew, there was no agreement between the two brothers

18

A.

Not that I'm aware of.

18 as - that he would have part - you know, other than that

19

Q.

Okay. Did you attribute Ron coming into the

19 he tried to make a place for him in the company when the

20 office less to this poor relationship he had with his

20 company sold.

21 brother?

21

22

A. Yes.

22 had tried to make a place for Marc in the new company?

23

Q.

23

Between 1986 and 1992, when Marc left the employ

Q.

Okay. Was it your understanding that Ron Smith

A. Yes.

24 of Grand Canyon, did you ever discuss with Marc his

24

Q.

On what basis did you understand that?

25 relationship with Ron?

25

A.

That he was going to be one of the partners in

27
1
2
3

29

A.

Pardon?

1 the company.

Q.

Between 1986 and mid 1992 - July, 1992, when

2

Marc was separated from the company, did you ever discuss

Q.

All right. What understanding did you have as

3 to Ron Smith's role in - in securing a place in the new

4 with Marc the - this tension between himself and Ron?

4 company for Marc Smith?

5

5

A.

I donl recall discussing it with Marc. I may

A.

if it hadn't have been for Ron Smith doing it,

6

have. I donl recall it right ~ I may have. I don't

6

7

really recall it.

7

Q.

How do you know that?

8

A.

Because the other two members of it didn't

8

Q.

Do you recall discussing it with Ron during that

it wouldn't have happened.

9

same time frame?

9

10

A. Very - yes.

10

11

Q.

11 would be Mr. DeNoyer and Mr. Mathis?

Okay. And what do you recall discussing with

really - really want a third member or a third partner.
Q.

And the other two members you're referring to

12 Ron in that connection?

12

A.

That's correct.

13

13

Q.

And you said that the other two did not want a

A.

He still really didnl know why Marc was so

14 upset with him. I think he felt like he had tried to talk

14 third partner, is that right?

15 to - to Marc and was unable to talk with him.

15

A. That's right.

16

Q.

16

Q.

Was this something that Ron communicated to you

17 in a personal conversation face-to-face?

Did you have any conversation with Mr. DeNoyer

17 or Mr. Mathis when they indicated as much to you?

18

A. Yes.

18

19

Q.

19 right after the sale of the business. Marty was very

Do you recall having more than one conversation

A.

I was sitting in the room when they discussed it

20 with Mr. Smith about that?

20 disappointed. He did not want to have a third partner.

21

A.

I think so.

21 And Michael just said, "We'll deal with it."

22

Q.

Could you, as you sit here today, assign any

122

Q.

And this was i n - a t the end of 1986, after the

23 time period to one or more of those conversations? In

23 business sold?

24 other words, it occurred in this year or that year?

24

25

A.

I cant say specifically what year. It was

A. Yes. Shortly thereafter. Just when the papers

25 were being finalized.

I
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARC SMITH,

)
)

PLAINTIFF,

)
)

VS.

) CASE NO. 940600003

)

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.,
MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL DENOYER,
RONALD R. SMITH, DONALD SAUNDERS,
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 5 AND JANE
DOES 1 THROUGH 5.
DEFENDANTS.

)
)
)
)
)
)

)

)

DEPOSITION OF DON SAUNDERS

TAKEN: APRIL 18. 1997

CONDENSED TRANSCRIPT/INDEX

INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS
5980 South Fashion Blvd.
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Page 2
1

D e p o s i t i o n o f DONALD A. SAUNDERS, taken on b e h a l f of

2

Plaintiff,

3

I s l a n d , Washington, on A p r i l 1 9 , 1 9 9 7 , commencing a t

' 4

1
2
3
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5
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7
8
9
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11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

a t 920 Hildebrand Ln. N . E . , B a i n b r i d g e

8:00 a . m . , b e f o r e KELLY SOMMERVILLB, R e g i s t e r e d

5

P r o f e s s i o n a l R e p o r t e r and Notary P u b l i c i n and f o r t h e

6

S t a t e o f Utah, p u r s u a n t t o N o t i c e .

7
8
9
10

APPEARANCES:

11
12
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

STIRBA & HATHAWAY
BY: BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR.
215 So. S t a t e S t . , Suice 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

17

VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
BY:
JOHN ANDERSON

18

50 So. Main S t . , Suite 1600
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84144

13
14
15
16

19
20

VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
BY:
RICHARD C . SKEEN

21

50 So. Main S t . , S u i t e 1600
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84144

22

ALSO PRESENT:

MARC SMITH

23
24
25
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I N D E X

4
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g

WITNESS

EXAMINATION BY

Don S a u n d e r s

Mr. Hathaway

PAGE
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1 7

1 8
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9

10
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EXHIBITS:
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No. 14 - L e t t e r
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Salt Lake City, Utah, April 18, 1997, 8:00 a.m.
DONALD A. SAUNDERS,
was duly sworn, was examined and
*
testified as follows:
BY MR. HATHAWAY:
Q. Don, would you state and spell your full name
for the record for us?
A. Donald, D-o-n-a-l-d, Arthur, A-r-t-h-u-r
Saunders, S-a-u-n-d-e-r-s.
Q. What's your address?
A. 5261 Battle Point Drive NE, Bainbridge Island,
Washington 98110.
Q. How long now have you lived on Bainbridge
Island?
A. Year and-a-half.
Q. Do you still have a residence in Arlington,
Washington?
A. No.
Q. Sold that place?
A. Yes.
Q. What is your birth date?
A. 7/25/34.
Q. Give me an idea if you would, Don, as to your
educational background.
A. I graduated from Lake Washington High School
Page 5
and then I did about 200 credit hours at University of
Washington but I didn't technically graduate in
accounting. I took a lot of accounting courses and
various other courses that I felt would further my
accounting background. I was in public accounting
business at the time, but I didn't need a certificate
because I was in business with my father.
Q. What did your father do?
A. He was a public accountant.
Q. So you were working with him doing those types
of things?
A. Yes.
Q. When was it that you finished any formal
education at University of Washington?
A. Probably the last regular course, see, I've
taken courses there. I guess I don't know what you mean
by formal. I kept taking courses off and on for, you
know, where they had seminars and different things like
that for years.
Q. Did you?
A. 20 years, yeah.
Q. Yeah.
A. And other places, you know, that I did some.
Q. Have you ever received any certificates?
A. No.

INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS*263-1396

Page 2 - Page 5
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Page 6
Q. No graduation diploma?
A. From the university?
Q. Right.
A. No.
Q. And you're not a C.P.A.?
A. No.
Q. Were you born in Washington?
A. Yes.
Q. Whereabouts?
A. Seattle.
Q. Lived here all your life?
A. Yes, uh-huh, lived in the state of Washington
all my life.
Q. Tell me if you would, Don, briefly about your
employment background starting from this point in time
when you were employed with your father.
A. I worked for my father for a few years, then as
a partner with my father for a few years, and then my
father retired and I ran the practice for a couple
years, and then I sold the practice and became the
financial officer for a boat building company.
Q. That was Bayliner Boats as I understand it?
A. Yes, uh-huh.
Q. When did you sell the practice?
A. In about September of '72.

Page I
1
2
3
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Q. How many employees were there at Saunders
Accounting and Bookkeeping at the time you sold it?
A. Five.
Q. Why don't you describe for us what you did
after going to work for Bayliner as the chief financial
officer.
A. When I went to work for Bayliner, I handled all
of the financial matters, the trucking department, the
-- all the computer operations, the health, accident,
all those types of things, all the employee benefit
programs. All of the hiring policies and hiring of all
the people were in my departments. I used to say it was
everything the other guys didn't want to do actually
there, but anyway, those types of things. I got
involved in manufacturing from time to time and in
the — somewhat in the design of the boats, pretty much
the whole thing.
Eventually, by 1976 there was the Five people who
eventually were the owners of the company, myself and
three other guys. We had lunch together every day and
we, between the four of us, we pretty much basically ran
the company under us because we were -- if everybody was
in town eating lunch together every day, we got involved
in each other's parts of the business. So I was
involved in everything, but primarily the parts I named.
Page'

Page 7
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Q. What was the practice known as at the time you
sold it?
A. Saunders Accounting and Bookkeeping.
Q. During your work with Saunders Accounting and
Bookkeeping, was Bayliner one of your customers,
clients?
A. Well, maybe we better distinguish on Bayliner.
It started out as Puget Advanced Outboard Marine,
Advanced Outboard went to Advanced Outboard Marine, went
to Puget Plastics, went to some different names but
for - we could just for simplicity purposes say
Bayliner. Bayliner was the name of the boats the
company built.
Q. I understand.
A. And so it's commonly known as that. The
corporate names were different things as well through
the years.
Q. What was the corporate name at the time you
became involved as the chief financial officer?
A. By then it was Bayliner Marine.
Q. And that was about in 1972?
A. '72, yes. I had for a number of years before
that done all our accounting and our office had done all
the payrolls and payables and everything for what was to
become eventually Bayliner Marine.
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Q. When did you become an owner in this entity
that became Bayliner Boats?
A. When I sold my accounting practice. The owner,
the person at that time that basically owned the whole
thing, Orin Edson, said he was going to have to get a
financial officer to come in and work in the company if
I wouldn't sell my accounting practice and go to work
for him. And so I made him a deal where he'd sell me
part of the company if I sold the accounting practice
and go to work for him simply because I was a little
bored with the accounting. It's the same old thing
every day. Bayliner was exciting and it was growing., I
knew I was taking a pretty good risk, but I just was
really impressed with it because my accounting practice,
the year I sold it, which brought it to a head was I had
taken two months off my practice. I had about a hundred
clients and it ran so smooth and was so good I'd just
take the summer off and tour around the country with my
kids. And while I was gone the two months they'd got in
some problems with personnel and everything at Bayliner,
so when I got back Orin says, Don, God, I've got to have
you do that. That was one of my very wise decisions and
I got rid of it.
Q. What percentage did you buy?
A. It varied and I bought more later. You know, I

Page 6 - Page
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can't remember what percentage that was. Eventually I
owned about four percent of Bayliner.
Q. Was Bayliner a publicly traded corporation?
A. No. When we sold the company in 1986, there
were four stockholders, two other people with the same
stock as me and then a majority. Orin owned the
majority.
Q. Who were the four shareholders with you?
A. Vinton Sommerville, David Livingston, and J.
OrinEdson.
Q. J. Orin Edson, and I take it from your prior
statements that he was the primary A. Yes.
Q. - shareholder?
A. Yes. He'd started the original company which
sold used outboards in Seattle.
Q. And he sold to the Brunswick Corporation,
correct?
A. We sold to the Brunswick.
Q. I'm sorry, you sold.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Brunswick, they still own Bayliner, don't they?
A. Yes. And there was a number of names. It
wasn't just Bayliner. Bayliner was the biggest
product. We had other companies within it. We had
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Page 13
Page 11
1
A. To some extent. Again, we ate lunch together
bought Chrysler Marine Corporation. You know, we had
2 every day.
other boat companies that were - Blue Fin Aluminum
3
Q. It was an oversight kind of function?
Boats, things like that, but Bayliner basically, yes,
4
A. Yeah. We'd talk about that and then we that's what we sold.
5 every Monday night we had a meeting for three or four
Q. Can you tell me what the other entities were
6 hours and that also included — and the lunch included
that was part of that deal?
7 maybe three other key personalities. It would vary from
A. I can't remember. There's lots of them. I'd
8 one to four as time went on, but it involved other
have to go through the records and look.
9 people. We were just together. I mean, we - and our
Q. But they were all included in your four percent
10 offices were all in a row in the offices, you know, so
ownership of the stock in this entity?
11 we saw each other lots.
A. Yes. They were all part of it. Originally
12
Q. You talked on a regular basis?
there was, you know, back in the early '70s, the common
13
A. Yeah.
thing was you keep a bunch of different corporations and
14
Q. When you sold Baylienr in 1986, how many
eventually we'd put them all together because you didn't
115 employees did Bayliner have?
have any tax advantage and it got messy and everything
16
A. About 7,000.
was one corporation. So finally as we bought any other
17
Q. How many employees would you consider at least
boat company we just took the assets and we didn't do
18 as of 1986 when you sold the business to have been in a
the corporations and stuff.
19 management sort of a position?
Q. Of the four shareholders of the company, who
20
A. In some type of management, do you consider a
was most involved in these acquisitions and handling -21 leadman, is he a management person?
at least the way these other business entities or
22
Q. That's a broad question.
enterprises you described were handled and incorporated
23
A. Yeah.
into the business?
24
Q. Were there other employees of the entity
A. Orin Edson and I. If it was a large one, we'd
25 besides the four of you which you considered to be key
generally negotiate it together because we'd play ping
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pong with the purchasers, you know. And then if it was,
you know, not a major deal, you know, we're buying a
200,000 square foot plant or something in Mississippi, I
might go negotiate it myself or whatever.
Q. Once you made the determination in this prior
entity to acquire an asset or to acquire an enterprise,
who was it that set up the actual structure, by the
Bayliner group or Bayliner company for lack of a better
name, to handle that new enterprise?
A. I don't understand your question.
Q. Well, you testified that in the '70s
everybody -- you used to set up the subsidiaries A. Uh-huh, right.
Q. — for other corporations that were involved
and ultimately there was no tax advantage to doing that
so you brought all the businesses in?
A. Sure, yep.
Q. As these acquisitions were subsequently made,
were they just purchased in the name of this Bayliner
company?
A. Yep, uh-huh.
Q. Were any of the four or the three remaining
shareholders involved at all with you directly in the
aspects of the business you described, you were involved
in primarily the accounting business?

INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS*263- $96
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Page 16

personnel involved in the operation of the business?
A. Many.
Q. Many?
A. We had 7,000 employees. There was many, many,
many.
Q. Was there a core group of decision makers for
the company besides the four of you?
A. Yes. The other people that went to like lunch
with us and met in our Monday night meeting were part of
that core group. The guy that ran our marketing or I
mean, actually our advertising department,
communications we called it, the guy that was the
bruntman as far as all the manufacturing operations.
Oh, various other people. There was probably 30 key
people. There was probably 30 people say in 1986 that
earned more than 100,000 a year and those are fairly ~
at that time that would be like a quarter of a million
today. Those were fairly key management people who
worked with us.
Q. Was there ever a point in time that the four of
you that owned and ultimately controlled the company had
disagreements about how to handle certain aspects of the
business?
A. Yeah, occasionally, uh-huh.
Q. Is it fair to say that that wasn't something
_ _

1
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that necessarily was uncommon?
MR. ANDERSON: rll object to the question. That's
overbroad.
THE WITNESS: Well, actually it was - it was very
uncommon in our company.
BY MR. HATHAWAY:
Q. How about within this group of 30 core people,
was it — I take it that some of those may have been
involved in generally the same aspect of the business?
A. Yes, uh-huh.
Q. In your experience with Bayiiner Corporation,
isn't it true that on occasion disputes arise as to how
to handle the operation of the business?
A. Not that I can really call disputes. We paid
our help extremely well. Probably our key people were
getting twice as much as anybody else in the industry.
We never had anybody stolen from us because everybody
would think I can't pay this guy that kind of money, so
we didn't have that kind of problem, so we had the very
best. So we, I mean, it was rare that I can ever
remember any disputes among the people. I mean, we had
the best and they worked it out and they were
reasonable. We didn't have that kind of problem.
It's like you ask the question about Orin, Slim, and
Dave and I getting at each other. I don't remember but

1
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5
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two times that we had over 18 years we really had any,
you know, really dispute that I had to kind of mediate
in the middle of you might say over that many years. So
there wasn't a lot. We were -- our business was making
money and we concentrated on that. We didn't have a lot
of infighting in the company. We didn't have -- we were
very untypical of a very large company, you know, or
large company because we didn't have a bunch of
politicking going on, and that's where you get all of
this infighting, you know. We didn't have it. I mean,
we paid our people well and we kept them real busy and
it's like I always said, just run the office short of
people so they don't have time to get their little
political groups together. So we didn't have it. It
was a really rare incidence.
Q. What have you done professionally since 1986
when you sold the business?
A. Professionally, nothing.
Q. Nothing.
A. I have businesses that other people - I mean,
it's like this, I don't get involved in them. I'm very
careful to stay kind of distanced from anything because
I don't want any involvement in my company.
Q. Tell me if you would, Don, what businesses
you've got going besides the Grand Canyon Expeditions?
Page 17
A. Let's see, right now, I believe I don't have
any except a land development company and GCE. I have
another corporation I guess it's got some land in it but
it's not very active. My land development company has
quite a bit. I have a son-in-law that runs that.
Q. What's the name of that company?
A. It's SK. Enterprises Company or it's Donald Don Saunders DBA. It's not a corporation.
Q. And I take it you're not in any way involved in
the management or operation of the business of the
entity?
A. I've been one time in the last few years just
on one piece of property where they were having some
problems selling it, and I got in with the guys that
were buying it and negotiated the sale price.
Q. What sort of development do they do?
A. Vacant lands, 300 acre lots, 1000 acre lots,
5000 acre lots, that kind of property.
Q. Is this recreational property?
A. Residential.
Q. Residential, so estate-type lots?
A. Yeah, uh-huh.
Q. Whereabouts are they operating?
A. Snohomish County in the state of Washington.
Q. Maybe you better spell Snohomish.
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John A. Anderson (4464)
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201 Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3131

Stirba and Hathaway

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS
CO.; MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL
DENOYER; DONALD SAUNDERS;
JOHN DOES 1 through 5; and JANE
DOES 1 through 5,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
(HEARING REQUESTED)
(FILED UNDER SEAL)
Civil No. 940600003

Defendants.
Hon. K. L. Mclff

Defendants Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. ("Grand Canyon" or the "Company"),
Donald Saunders ("Saunders"), Michael Denoyer ("Denoyer"), and Martin Mathis ("Mathis")
(collectively referred to as "Defendants") submit the following points and authorities in
support of their motion for summary judgment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendants previously moved for summary judgment on all claims for relief set forth
in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. The court granted partial summary judgment to
Defendants, dismissing the first claim for relief in its entirety and the second claim for relief in
SLCl-474812 33714-0001
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attorney, Mr. Skeen, that Plaintiffs stock was being purchased and he would need to prepare a
buy-out amount consistent with the Buy/Sell Agreement. IdL
Denoyer and Mathis were completely unsophisticated in financial and accounting
matters. They relied upon the accounting expertise of the Company's accountant Mr. Willis.
Mr. Willis has attested that there was no manipulation of the books and records of Grand
Canyon to create an artificially low buy-out amount for Plaintiff. ML 1 22. Moreover, this
theory is seriously undermined by the fact that Plaintiff, in essence, dictated the timing of his
departure.4
Plaintiffs counsel also appears to be under the mistaken impression that Grand
Canyon's investment in White Water mysteriously disappeared in the consolidated financial
statement prepared by Mr. Willis. In fact, the investment appears in the asset column of White
Water that is added to Grand Canyon's assets. Sfi£ Exs. "F", "G", and "H". Counsel's
libelous suggestion that Grand Canyon engaged in income tax fraud through erasure is
unsupported by any factual evidence and simply indicates the depths to which counsel will sink
to manufacture an illusory issue of fact. S££ Plaintiffs counsel's letter to Court dated January
18, 1999 (attached hereto as Exhibit "R").
Plaintiffs counsel has also misrepresented to the Court previously that Grand Canyon's
financial condition was worse in July 1992 than at any point in the history of the Company.
As noted at the last hearing, and confirmed through Mr. Willis' Affidavit and the data
available to Plaintiffs counsel, Grand Canyon's position was significantly better in July 1992
4

The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff demanded that his employment
difficulties with Grand Canyon be resolved during the 1992 rafting season, rather than thereafter
as Denoyer and Grand Canyon would have preferred. Sfi£ Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, filed October 30, 1998 (citing deposition testimony).
SLCl-47481 2 33714-0001
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DATED this???day of March, 1999.
STOEL RIVES LLP

4J;
John A. Anderson
Matthew M. Durham
Attorney for Defendants
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS.
UNTIL
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR
WITHDRAWAL.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
James DISHINGER and Nancy Dishinger dba
TCBY Yogurt,
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and Cross-appellees,
v.
Jana POTTER dba Silver Queen Hotel, Defendant,
Appellee, and
Cross-appellant.
No. 20000081-CA.
June 28, 2001.
Commercial tenants filed declaratory judgment
action asking court to interpret lease provision
regarding monthly rental rate.
Landlord
counterclaimed for breach of lease and unlawful
detainer. After jury trial, the Third District Court,
Coalville Department, Robert K. Hilder and Pat B.
Brian, JJ., entered judgment for landlord in amount of
$8,730.
Tenants appealed, and landlord crossappealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that:
(1) jury's special verdict was not advisory, and thus
trial court was bound by jury's findings; (2) accord and
satisfaction precluded finding of unlawful detainer; (3)
waiver provision in lease did not preclude rinding of
accord and satisfaction; (4) landlord was entitled to
administrative fees; (5) landlord was not entitled to late
fees; and (6) remand was necessary to deteraiine
prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees.
Reversed and remanded
Orme, J., dissented andfiledopinion.
[1] Appeal and Error <S=> 1078(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(K) Error Waived in Appellate Court
30kl078 Failure to Urge Objections
30kl078(l) In General.
Tenants could raise issue of accord and satisfaction
on appeal, even though issue was not raised in
pleadings, as record showed that evidence regarding
existence of accord and satisfaction was presented at
Copyright (c) West Group 2002

Pagel
trial, jury was instructed on and made findings of fact
that supported accord and satisfaction, and landlord had
opportunity to prepare and meet issue. Rules CivProc.,
Rule 15(b).
[2] Pleading <S=»427
302 —
302XVIII Waiver or Cure of Defects and
Objections
302k427 Objections to Evidence as Not Within
Issues.
If an issue is fully tried, a court may decide the issue
and deem the pleadings amended even if the issue was
not originally pleaded, and whether the pleadings may
be deemed amended depends on whether the opposing
party had a fair opportunity to prepare and meet the
issue.
[3] Appeal and Error <®=>498.1
30 —
30X Record
30X(A) Matters to Be Shown
30k498 Presentation and Reservation of
Grounds of Review
30k498.1 In General.
Commercial tenants who appealed from jury's
special verdict were not required to provide transcript
of proceedings below or marshal evidence, as tenants
were not challenging findings of fact but' trial court's
application of law to jury's special verdict findings.
[4] Declaratory Judgment <®=^369
118A —
118 AH1 Proceedings
118AIII(F) Hearing and Determination
118Ak369 Verdict and Findings.
Jury's special verdict in declaratory judgment action
brought by tenants against landlord was not advisory,
and thus trial court was bound by jury's findings, as
both parties pursued legal, not equitable claims, tenants
demanded jury trial on claims, and trial court did not
inform parties or jury that jury was merely advisory.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 49(a).
[5] Trial <S^347
388 —
388IX Verdict
388EX(B) Special Interrogatories and Findings
388k346 Power of Jury to Find Specially
388k347 Special Verdict.
In the case of a special verdict, the jury only finds
the facts, and the court applies the law thereto and
renders the verdict.
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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[6] Accord and Satisfaction <©=» 10(1)
8 —
8k6 Part Payment
8kl0 Disputed or Unliquidated Claims
8kl0(l) In General.
[See headnote text below]
[6] Accord and Satisfaction <©==> 11 (2)
8 —
8k6 Part Payment
8kll Conditioned on Acceptance as Payment in
Full
8k 11(2) Remittances on Condition.
Accord and satisfaction was established in dispute
between commercial tenant and landlord as to rental
rate, and thus tenants were not in unlawful detainer,
where jury found a good faith agreement over amount
due under lease, payments tendered were made in full
satisfaction of disputed rent, and landlord negotiated
check, which contained notation that amount was for
new base rent.
[7]
Accord and Satisfaction <®^ 1
8 —
8k 1 Nature and Requisites in General.
To establish an accord and satisfaction, three
elements must be present: (1) an unliquidated claim or
a bona fide dispute over the amount due, (2) a payment
offered as full settlement of the entire dispute, and (3)
an acceptance of the payment as full settlement of the
dispute.
[8] Accord and Satisfaction <®^> 10(1)
8 —
8k6 Part Payment
8k 10 Disputed or Unliquidated Claims
8kl0(l) In General.
To satisfy the requirement that there be a good-faith
disagreement over the amount due under the contract,
as required to establish an accord and satisfaction, the
disagreement need not be well-founded, so long as it is
in good faith.
[9] Contracts <©=> 15
95 —
951 Requisites and Validity
951(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance
95k 15 Necessity of Assent.
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the
parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or
implicitly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced.
Copyright (c) West Group 2002
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[10] Trial <®^358
388 —
388IX Verdict
388IX(B) Special Interrogatories and Findings
388k358 Inconsistent Findings.
Where a jury's special verdict findings support
inconsistent legal claims, a court is not precluded from
applying the law to those findings and entering
judgment for a party on one theory, as a matter of law,
which precludes judgment on another inconsistent legal
theory. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 49(a).
[11] Accord and Satisfaction <S=»10(1)
8-~
8k6 Part Payment
8k 10 Disputed or Unliquidated Claims
8kl0(l) In General.
[See headnote text below]
[11] Accord and Satisfaction <©==> 11 (2)
8—8k6 Part Payment
8k 11 Conditioned on Acceptance as Payment in
Full
8k 11 (2) Remittances on Condition.
Waiver provision in commercial lease providing
that acceptance of rent did not constitute waiver did not
preclude finding of accord and satisfaction based on
tenants' tender of check for disputed rent amount, as
lease provision did not provide that acceptance of
partial rent did not constitute accord and satisfaction,
and landlord could not claim that check tendered by
tenants was partial rent, as there was no agreement as
to amount of rent upon expiration of lease.
[12] Landlord and Tenant <8==>238
233 —
233 VIII Rent and Advances
233 VIII(B) Actions
233k238 Costs.
Landlord was entitled to administrative fees
*726259
in dispute with commercial tenant, despite
jury's finding of accord and satisfaction with respect to
rent due, where lease unambiguously provided that
tenants would pay for all costs and fees association with
supervising and administering common areas.
[13] Landlord and Tenant <@^>216
233 —
233 VIII Rent and Advances
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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233 Vm(A) Rights and Liabilities
233k216 Penalties or Double Rent.
Landlord was not entitled to late fees under lease
provision based on tenant's alleged failure to pay rent,
as there was accord and satisfaction as to rent due, and
thus tenants were current on rent payments.
[ 14] Appeal and Error <@=> 1177(5)
30 —
30XVII Determination and Disposition of Cause
30XVQ(D) Reversal
30k 1177 Necessity of New Trial
30kl 177(5) Errors in Rulings and
Instructions at Trial.
Remand was necessary in dispute between landlord
and commercial tenants to determine which party was
entitled to attorney fees as prevailing party, where trial
court's finding of unlawful detainer was reversed on
appeal.
Third District, Coalville Department.
The Honorable Robert K. Hilder.
The Honorable Pat B. Brian.
Dwayne A. Vance and David B. Thompson, Park
City, for Appellants.
Robert M. Felton, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
**1 f 1 Plaintiffs James and Nancy Dishinger dba
TCBY Yogurt (the Dishingers) appeal the trial court's
judgment finding them in unlawful detainer. Defendant
Jana Potter dba Silver Queen Hotel (Potter) crossappeals the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on
the meaning of "prevailing rate" and its failure to award
her administrative, late, and attorney fees. We reverse
and remand.

BACKGROUND
H 2 In May of 1990, Erik Ziskend entered into a
commercial lease with Potter for premises located on
Main Street in Park City, Utah. On May 31, 1994,
Ziskend assigned the lease to the Dishingers. Potter
consented to the assignment. The Dishingers operated

Page 3
afrozenyogurt shop on the premises.
T[ 3 The lease provided for continuous three year
options after expiration of the initial three year lease
term. Under the terms of the lease, the Dishingers, as
tenants, were required to notify Potter in writing of
their desire to exercise the option 120 days prior to the
expiration of the current lease term. The lease
specified that the rental rate for an option period would
be "adjusted upward, but not less than the current
Minimum Monthly Rent being paid, to the then
prevailing rental rate of similar buildings in the Main
Street area of Park City, Utah." (FN1)
f 4 On February 1, 1996, the Dishingers notified
Potter in writing of their desire to exercise the lease
renewal option.
Thereafter, the following
correspondence took place. On April 4, 1996, Potter
advised the Dishingers that the prevailing rental rate of
similar buildings on Main Street in Park City was $30
per square foot and thus, pursuant to the lease, $30 per
square foot ($2,425.00/month) would constitute the
new base monthly rent. The Dishingers responded that,
based on the appraisal they had performed, the
prevailing rental rate of similar buildings was $19 per
square foot ($1,535.83/month).
^[5 At the commencement of the July 1, 1996
renewal period, without an agreement as to what would
constitute the base monthly rent, the Dishingers began
paying rent in an amount reflecting their appraisal of
$19 per square foot. They sent Potter a check for
$1,976.92, clearly noting it was for "New Base Rent."
On July 8, 1996, Potter sent the Dishingers a notice of
default on the grounds that the Dishingers were
$889.17 delinquent in their July rental payment. On
July 13, 1996, Potter served the Dishingers with a
notice to pay the remaining rent or quit. On July 15,
1996, Potter negotiated the Dishinger's July 1 rent
check. On the first of every month, from July 1996
through June 1997, the Dishingers sent Potter a check
for $2,137.11 (FN2) reflecting $19 per square foot in
base monthly rent. Potter negotiated each of those
checks.
f 6 On August 8, 1996, the Dishingers filed a
declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to
interpret the lease provision regarding the monthly
rental rate. Potter counter-claimed for breach of lease
and unlawful detainer.
**2 Tj 7 After a jury trial, the jury returned a
special verdict answering a number of factual

Copyright (c) West Group 2002 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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questions. In the special verdict the jury found there
was a legitimate dispute as to the "then prevailing
rental rate," that the Dishingers tendered payment to
Potter in full satisfaction of the disputed amount based
on their appraisal of $19, and that Potter accepted the
rent payments after the July 13 notice to quit. The jury
also found the "then prevailing rental rate" to be $25
per square foot, and as such, Potter was entitled to
recover the balance of base rent, totaling $8,730.
^[8 The Dishingers filed a motion for entry of
judgment based on the special verdict, arguing that the
jury's special verdict established an accord and
satisfaction, which fixed the base rental rate at $19 per
square foot, and thus, they were current in monthly
payments and Potter's unlawful detainer claim should
be dismissed. The Dishingers also argued that a
determination that they were in unlawful detainer of the
premises was precluded because Potter accepted rental
payments after serving the notice to quit, thus waiving
forfeiture of the lease.
<fl 9 The trial court, first Judge Brian, then Judge
Hilder in an amended judgment, entered judgment for
Potter. The trial court concluded that, based on the
findings of the jury in its special verdict, it was "clear"
that while Potter accepted payments after the notice to
quit, the amount received "did not represent a full
payment of base rent," and thus did not constitute an
accord and satisfaction. Thus, the trial court concluded
the Dishingers were in unlawful detainer and entered
judgment in favor of Potter for $8,730, which was
trebled to $26,190 pursuant to Utah Code §vnn.
78-36-10 (1996). This appeal followed.
f 10 On appeal, the Dishingers argue the trial court
was precluded from detemiining they were in unlawful
detainer because the jury's special verdict established
an accord and satisfaction as a matter of law.
Alternatively, the Dishingers argue that Potter affirmed
the lease by accepting rent payments, thereby waiving
forfeiture of the lease, and thus precluding a finding of
unlawful detainer.
H 11 Potter cross-appeals, arguing the trial court
should have instructed the jury that the "then prevailing
rental rate" meant market rate. Potter also argues the
trial court erred by failing to award her administrative
fees, late fees, and attorney fees as required by the
lease.
ANALYSIS
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I. Preliminary Issues
f 12 In addition to the claims raised in her crossappeal, Potter asserts that the Dishingers failed to
preserve their claims below, failed to provide a
transcript of the proceedings and marshal the evidence,
and cannot rely on the jury's special verdict because it
was merely advisory. Before addressing the main
substantive issues on appeal, we first address these
threshold arguments.
A. Preservation of Claims
[1][2] 113 Potter first argues the Dishingers failed
to preserve their claim of accord and satisfaction in
accordance with Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Rule 24(a)(5)(A) provides that
"[t]he brief of the appellant shall contain ... citation to
the record showing that the issue was preserved in the
trial court." Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). The
Dishingers reference several places in the record to
show that the issue of accord and satisfaction was
preserved in the trial court. (FN3) Thus, Potter's
argument that the Dishingers did not preserve the issue
of accord and satisfaction is without merit. (FN4)
B. Marshaling the Evidence
**3 [3^114 Potter next argues the Dishingers
needed to provide a transcript of the proceedings to
allow meaningful review of the evidence, and have also
failed to marshal the evidence. A transcript of the
proceedings is not required because the Dishingers are
relying on the jury's special verdict on appeal, not the
evidence presented at tria See, e.g Pugh v. North
Am. Warranty Servs., Inc. 2000 UT App 12rf 11, 1
P.3d 570. Moreover, the marshaling requirement
applies only when challenging findings of f See
Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12f 24, 973 P.2d 431.
Clearly, the Dishingers are not challenging findings of
fact. Rather, they are challenging the trial court's
application of the law to the jury's special verdict
findings and thus the Dishingers do not have the burden
of marshaling the evidence.
C. Advisory Jury Verdict
[4] H 15 Relying oi Peirce v. Peirce 2000 UT 7,
994 P.2d 193, Potter next argues that the jury's special
verdict was merely advisory, and therefore the trial
court was not bound by the jury's findings in the special
verdict. Potter's reliance c Peirce is misplaced. In
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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Peirce, the issue before the court was "whether the jury
served in an advisory capacity or whether [the] case
was tried by a jury as a matter of ngl Id a1<f 12
However, the plaintiff Peirc was seeking an
equitable remedy See id "When a jury is used in an
equity case, it acts in an advisory c* /Jity,"
(quoting Romrell v Zions First Nat'l Ban 611 P 2d
392, 394 (Utah 1980) (quotation and citation
omitted)), " 'unless both parties have clearly consented
to accept a jury verdict' " Id at % 13 (quoting Romrell,
611 P 2d at 394 see als Utah R Civ P 39(c)
Because the parties did not clearly consent to accept a
jury verdict, and the record indicated that the tnal court
treated the jury as advisory, the court held that the jury
served only m an advisory capacity and thus afforded
no deference to its findings See id at ^f 15

facts in this case, and to consider and weigh the
evidence for that purpose", "You are exclusive
judges of the facts and the evide" (Emphasis
added) The tnal court then entered judgmenUBased
upon the evidence and the special verdict" (Emphasis
added) Thus, the jury was not merely advisory
Rather, the jury found the facts as set forth in its special
verdict and the tnal court entered judgment applying
the law to those facts

^ 16 In the instant case, we are not dealing with an
action in equity Both the Dishingers and Potter
pursued legal claims, the Dishingers specifically
demanded a jury tnal on those claims, and at no time
did the tnal court inform the parties or the jury that the
jury was merely advise (Goldberg v Jay
Timmons & Assoc. 896 P 2d 1241, 1244 (Utah
Ct App 1995) (stating, "if the tnal court had mtended
to use an advisory jury, it should have notified the
parties before the tnal began") Where, as here, the
case is tned to a jury as a matter of nght, Rule 49(a) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the tnal
court to "require a jury to return only a special verdict
in the form of a special wntten finding upon each issue
of fact" UtahR Civ P 49(a) "The [tnal] court then
applies the law to the facts as found and renders a
verdict" Brigham v Moon Lake Elec Ass'r 24 Utah
2d 292, 298, 470 P 2d 393, 397 (1970) (Ellett, J,
further opinion) (commenting on Rule 49(a))
**4
|^| 17 As Justice Ellett explamed m
Brigham.
The special verdict was devised to relieve the jury
of attempting to apply the law m a complicated case
to the facts m amving at a verdict Instructions to
the jury are thus simplified, and the jurors may,
therefore, concentrate upon the functions which
belong to them, viz, tofindthe facts in the case
Id Thus, "[i]n [the] case of a special verdict, the
jury only finds the facts, and the court applies the law
thereto and renders the veidn /< This is what
occurred m the instant case The tnal court instructed
the jury "[I]t is yoi exclusive duty to determine the

II Accord and Satisfaction
[6] % 18 The Dishingers argue that an accord and
satisfaction occurred pnor to tnal which set the rental
rate at $19 per square foot thus precluding afindingof
unlawful detainer They claim the jury's special verdict
answers require a legal determination of accord and
satisfaction Whether the special verdict established an
accord and satisfaction is a question of law which we
review for correctness without any deference to the tnal
court SeeProMaxDev Corp v Raile 2000 UT 4^
17, 998 P 2d 254
A Elements of Accord and Satisfaction
[7] ^119 To establish an accord and satisfaction,
three elements must be present "(1) an unliquidated
claim or a bona fide dispute over the amount due, (2) a
payment offered as full settlement of the entire dispute,
and (3) an acceptance of the payment as full settlement
of the dispute " Id at ^ 20 (citmg Marton Remodeling
v Jensen, 706 P 2d 607,609-10 (Utah 1985))
1 Bona Fide Dispute Over Amount Due
[8] [9] K 20 To satisfy the first element, "There must
be a good-faith disagreement over the amount due
under the contract The disagreement need not be wellfounded, so long as it is m good Estate
Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc v
Mountain States Tel & Tel Cc 844 P 2d 322, 326
(Utah 1992) (citmg Golden Key Realty, Inc v Mantas,
699 P 2d 730, 733 (Utah 1985 Ashton v Sheen 85
Utah 489, 496, 39 P 2d 1073, 1076 (1935)) The jury
clearly found that there was a good faith disagreement
over the amount due under the lease (FN5) The jury
was asked
Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you
find by a preponderance of the evidence that a
legitimate dispute existed as to the "then prevailing
rental rate of similar buildings in the Mam Street
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.area of Park City" at the time the 11 )< JungerH made
monthly rental payments based on ' - ^ •
foot as satisfaction in full?

" hus, the first eleiw*,
„*xord and satisfaction was
established by the jury's special verdict.
2. Payment Tendered in Full Satisfaction of Dispute
'f 21 Hie jury found that "the payments tendered by
the Dishingers were made in full satisfaction of the
disputed rent. The jury was asked: "Considering all the
evidence in this case, do you find by a preponderance
of the evidence that the [Dishingers] notified [Potter]
that these payments were made m full satisfaction of the
disputed rent amount?" The jury answered, "Yes."
Thus, the second element of accord and satisfaction
was established by the jury's special verdict.
3 Acceptance of Payment as Full Settlement of
Dispute
If 22 In Estate Landscape, the Utah Supreme Court
reasoned that the third element of accord and
satisfaction may be satisfied by the creditor's subjective
intent to discharge an obligation by assenting to the
accord, oi conduct which gives rise to a reasonable
inference that acceptance of payment discharged the
obligation. See Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 330
f 23 In the instant case, the jury found that Potter
accepted the monthly payments made by the
Dishingers. The jury was asked: "Considering all of
the evidence in this case, do you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that [Potter] accepted
the monthly rent payments made by the [Dishingers]
which are calculated at a rate of $ 19 per square foot?"
The jury answered, "Yes." However, the jury did not
make a finding that Potter subjectively intended to
assent to the accord. The fact that Potter counterclaimed for breach of the lease and unlawful detainer
shows she did not subjectively intend to assent to the
accord. Thus, to find an accord and satisfaction, we
must determine whether Potter's conduct established
the accord and satisfaction as a matter of law
«!j 24 ft Estate Landscape the delendant M;M; the
plaintiff a check for $8,613, and followed it with a
letter stating that the check was "payment in full for
satisfaction of contracted services. If you are not
willing to accept that sum, in full satisfaction of the
C^pMliii 1 !

V\tM h|.>.:!-

v

)()2

o

-nm* due. DO NOT negotiate the check, for upon your
urgotiation of that check, we will treat the matter as
'•illy paid.' Ic at 324-25 (emphasis omitted) The
w '-»V filed suit to recover the $30,162.50 it thought
.i wa; owed by the defendant, then negotiated the
$8,613 check, and amended its complaint to recover
the difference. See id. at 325.
% 25 The trial court ruled that negotiation of the
check did not constitute an accord and satisfaction. See
id. This court affirmed, over Judge Jackson's dissent,
reasoning that the defendant's letter was "entirely
unilateral," and that the plaintiffs
signature on the check is not an assent to an accord
not found on the face of the check as a restrictive
endorsement, where the party to whom the accord is
offered has expressly rejected the proposed accord,
continued the dispute, and filed ,M".ytion to resolve
it adversarial Iv in court
**6
Specialists,

t Mtuf /.u//uv>ci^/t i*. v/i.vi
ticmisxai
Inc. v Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co..

793 P.2d 415, 419-20 (Utah Ct.App.1990) <footnote
omitted),revW, 844 P.2d 322 (I Jtah 1992).
1| 26 The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and
reversed, holding, "Where, as here, the check is
tendered under the condition that negotiation will
constitute full settlement, mere negotiation of the check
constitutes the accord, regardless of the payee's efforts
or intent to negate the condition Estate Landscape,
844 P.2d at 330. Thus, " '[w]hat is said is overridden
by what is done, and assent is imputed as an inference
of law/ Id. (quoting Hudson v. Ynnkers Fruit Co.,
258 N.Y. 168, 179 N.E. 373, 374 (193: see also
Morton Remodeling v. dense 706 P.2d 607, 609
(Utah 1985) (holding negotiation of check with
restrictive condition is an accord and satisfaction even
though creditor wrote "not lull payment" beneath
condition pnor to negotiation) Cove View Excavating
& Constr. Co. v. Fly) 758 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah
Ct.App.1988) (finding an accord and satisfaction even
though creditor crossed out restrictive condition on
check before negotiation)
1j 27 In the mstant case, the Dislunger's first check
noted the amount thereof was for "New Base Rent."
Therefore, because Potter negotiated the check, which
was tendered by the Dishmgers in full satisfaction of
the disputed amount of the base monthly rent, the fact
that Potter at the same time brought an action for
;> claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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breach of lease and •'unlawful detainer is of no legal
consequence. (FN6) The third and final element of
accord and satisfaction was established by Potter's
conduct.
B. Special Verdict
\ 28 In its special verdict, the jury found: (1) "that a
legitimate dispute existed as to the 'then prevailing
rental rate of similar buildings in the Mam Street area
of Park City' at the time the [Dishingers] made monthly
rental payments based on $19 per square foot as
satisfaction in full;" (2) the Dishingers "notified [Potter]
that [the] payments were made in full satisfaction of the
disputed amount;" and (3) Potter "accepted the monthly
rent payments made by the [Dishingers]
at a rate of
$ 19 per square foot."
\ 29 However, the jury also found that the
prevailing rental rate was $25 per square foot, and that
Potter was entitled to recover the "balance of base rent"
from the Dishingers, totaling $8,730. Based on these
findings, the trial court entered judgment for Potter,
concluding that no accord and satisfaction existed and
that the Dishingers were in unlawful detainer because
the amount Potter received and accepted each month
was less than what the jury subsequently determined to
be the rental rate.
(MH* Ms Although it could be argued that the
special verdict supports inconsistent legal theories
(accord and satisfaction and unlawful detamer), the
inconsistency is not fatal The jury was instructed to
answer all factual questions on all legal theories
presented in the special verdict. While the jury's
findings support inconsistent legal claims, a court is not
precluded, under Rule 49(a), from applying the law to
those findings and entering judgment for a party on one
theory, as a matter of law, which precludes judgment
on another inconsistent legal theor SeiMilligan v.
Capitol Furniture Co. 8 Utah 2d 383, 387, 335 P.2d
619, 622 (1959) (holding inconsistent special verdict
answers immaterial under Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a see
also Tsudek v. Target Stores, Inc 414 N.W.2d 466,
469-70 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding inconsistent
special verdict answers reconcilable where jury was
simply answering all questions submitted based on the
evidence). Thus, as was the case here, if the special
verdict findings support, as a matter of law, an accord
and sati si act ion then there cannot be an unlawful
detainer.
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l"«R*"
C. Effect of Lease Provision
' i " 7 [ 1111" 31 Potter responds that even if 'the
jury's special verdict findings support an accord and
satisfaction, the lease itself precludes an accord and
satisfaction. Potter relies on the "Waiver" provision of
the lease which states:
riie waiver by Landlord of any term, covenant or
condition herein contained shall not be deemed to
be a waiver of such terms, covenant or condition or
any subsequent breach of the same or any other
temi. covenant or condition herein containec The
M-'^-t'quent acceptance of rent hereunder by
*'h*h)rd shall not be deemed to be a waiver of
mv preceding default by Tenant of any term,
•ovcnant or condition of this Lease, other than the
failure of Tenant to pay particular rent also
accepted, regardless of Landlord's knowledge of
such preceding default at the time of the acceptance
of such rent,
(Emphasis added.) Potter asserts that under this
lease provision, "acceptance of partial rent could not
constitute an accord and satisfaction."
1(32 Though not perfectly drafted, the boilerplate
language of this "Waiver" provision is not ambiguous.
The relevant portion, emphasized above, provides that
if the Dishingers default on any term, covenant, or
condition of the lease, and thereafter tender a rental
payment to Potter, and Potter accepts, by accepting.
Potter has not waived the prior defaults. For example,
if the Dishmgers mstall exterior lighting as prohibited
by the lease, the installation, if not cured within thirty
days of notice, is a default.
If, thereafter, the
Dishingers send Potter a rent check winch Potter
accepts. Potter has not waived the Dishinger's default
for the installation. However, if the Dishinger's default
for failure to pay rent, and thereafter tender a rental
payment to Potter, which Potter accepts, Potter thereby
waives the Dishinger's default for failure to pay rent.
I! 33 What the lease provision does not provide, is
that acceptance of partial rent does not constitute an
accord and satisfaction. In fact, the term "accord and
satisfaction" is conspicuously absent from the face of
the lease, and beyond the "Waiver" provision, Potter
fails to point to any language in the lease that would
support her strained construction. Additionally, and
perhaps more importantly, Potter cannot claim that the
initial check tendered by the Dishmgers was "partial
cl aim to original'

x
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rent," when there was never an agreement as to what
would actually b e the rental rate. While hindsight
suggests that Potter should have provided for such a
situation in the lease, we cannot write such a provision
into the lease for h Se Jones v. ERA Brokers
Consol., 2000 UT 61118, 6 P.3d 1129 see alscRio
Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah
1980); Provo City Corp. v. Nielsen Scott Co., 603 P.2d
803, 806 (Utah 1979). Thus, Potter's argument that the
lease prohibits an accord and satisfaction is not

paid in Ml. Tenant farther agrees to , -tv -nattorney's fees [sic] incurred by Landlord b} reason
of Tenant's failure to pay rent and/or other charges
when due hereunder.

S u p p o r t e d l n lh< leas-: i l s r l f

(Emphasis added.) Thus, Potter was only entitled
to It „te fees and attorney fees 'under 'this provision if the
Dishingers .failed to pay rent. Because we conclude
there was an accord and satisfaction, the Dishingers
::! ;:; current on their rent payments and therefore
P : It; : II: was not entitled to late fees. (FN9)

^| .34 In sum, the jury's special verdict established as
a matter of law an accord and satisfaction. The trial
court erred in not entering a judgment on the rental rate
for the option period in favor of the Dishingers. We
therefore reverse the trial court's judgment of unlawful
detainer and remand for the entry of a judgment for the
Dishingers based on the legal theory of accord and
satisfaction setting the rental rate at $19 per square
foot. (FN7)

[14] f 38 The trial court determined that Potter was
not entitled to attorney fees because the lease provided
that the "prevailing party shall be entitled to recover"
<nomey fees, and while Potter prevailed on her
er-ciaim, the Dishingers prevailed on their claims
for an accounting and credit for overcharges of
common area expenses.
Thus, the trial court
determined neither party should be awarded attorney
fees because both prevailed.

III A dministi ative I ate and, Attorney Fees
* *8 112] Tf 35 Potter argues that the lease provides
that the Dishingers shall pay administrative, late, and
attorney fees.
Potter submitted her claims for
administrative and late fees to the jury. In its special
verdict, the jury found that, in addition to what the
Dishingers had already paid to Potter, Potter was only
entitled to the "Balance of base rent." Based on this
finding, the trial court determined that Potter was not
entitled to administrative and late fees. However, this
was properly a legal not a factual determination. The
lease is clear and unambiguous that Potter was entitled
to administrative fees The lease states m no uncertain
terms that the tenant shall pay for all costs and fees
associated with supervising and administering to the
common areas. (FN8)
*[[ 36 The Dishingers respond that Potter's argument
for administrative fees was not presented below.
However, the trial court clearly ruled on the issue based
on the jury's special verdict findings. Thus, Potter's
• %1a-m for administrative fees was presented below.
'therefore, we reverse and remand to the trial court for
an award of Potter's administrative fees.
f 1 3] 1] 37 1 he lease fi it thei pi oxides:
Tenant shall pay to Landlord late charge of ten
($1000) dollars per day Iin, til, the amount due is
Copyright (c) West Group 2002

1J 39 Because we conclude that there was an accord
and satisfaction and thus no unlawful detamer, the
"prevailing party" issue as to attorney fees should be
reconsidered by the trial court on remand, rherefore,
pursuant to the terms of the lease, Potter is entitled to
her administrative fees, and we remand to have the trial
court determine if either party should be awarded
attorney fees as the "prevailing parn" under the lease.
CONCI IJSION
1]" 4() 'We conclude, based on the jury's special
verdict, an accord and satisfaction occurred as a matter
of law fixing the "then prevailing rental rate" for the
option period of the lease at $19 per square foot in base
monthly rent. Therefore, because the Dishingers were
in lawful possession of the premises, we reverse the
trial court's legal determination of unlawful detainer
and its award of treble damages. We further conclude
that under the terms of the lease, Potter was entitled to
her administrative fees and remand for the trial court to
determine if either party is entitled to attorney fees as
the "prevailing party" under the lease.
II 41 I i i)N( III? Wll 1 I >\M >, IIUHRNE, Jr.,
Judge.
Ok Ml-

:tkh;e .di^enlim:s

**9 c 42 1 cannot ()gie» there w a s an accord and
satisfaction in this ease While there was a bona fide
claim.to original : , v> u o \ i works
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ilispute over the new rental rate and the Dishingers may
well have tendered their payments with the thought it
was in full satisfaction of what was due, there is no
finding that Pott accepte* the payments in full
satisfaction nor any basis in the evidence to conclude
that she did so. On the contrary, the Dishingers and
Potter had exchanged letters indicating very different
views of what constituted the "then prevailing rental
rate." Nothing suggests either side thereafter acceded
to the view of the other or that they reached a
compromise. On the contrary, within days of accepting
the Dishingers' check. Potter sent the Dishingers a
default notice stating what she believed the shortfall to
be. A couple of weeks later, the Dishingers filed their
declaratory judgment action acknowledging there was a
dispute between the parties and asking the court to
resolve it-not claiming there had been a dispute
between the parties that had been resolved by accord
and satisfaction and asking the court: to enforce the
accord.
1J43 Applicable law does not require anything
inconsistent with the expectations of the parties, as
shown by their conduct
The "New Base Rent"
notation, apparently made in the "For
" space
on the front of the check, clearly does not satisfy the
IJCC's requirement that "the instrument or an
accompanying written communication contain! ] a
conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument
was tendered ^.i full satisfaction of the claim." I Jtah
Code Ann. § 70A-3-311(2) (1997) (emphasis added).
In addition, cases relied on by the majority are
inapposite. In both Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706
P.2d 607 (Utah 1985), an Cove View Excavating &
Construction Co. v. Fly 758 P.2d 474 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988), unlike in this case, the checks
evidencing the accord and satisfaction contained actual
restrictive endorsement provisio
I Marton
Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 608 ("Endorsement hereof
constitutes full and final satisfaction of any and all
claims...."); Cove Vie 758 P.2d at 476 (check
contained "pmt. in full" language on front of check and
this restrictive endorsement language on back of check;
-t\ ment in full for all labor and materials to 6/26/84").
in Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc.
v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Cc 844
P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), a detailed letter made it clear
f
hat the check could be accepted only as full payment.
See id at 324-25.
* 44 As a matter of law. the facts in this case do not
estahii>h ji' t..^«:J n\.\ satisfaction.
The jury
Copyright (c) West Group 2002
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i : • :> : gnized this and. went on to find that the prevailing
rental rate was $25 per square foot and that the
Dishingers owed this to Potter under their contract.
Does this mean the Dishingers unlawfully detained the
<^nses, subjecting them to treble damages? It does
Potter, in her "notice to pay rent or quit,"
demanded payment of a sum well in excess of what she
' led to contractually. The jury found the
rate was $25, but she had demanded
payment of $30. The invalid demand renders the notice
•pletely ineffective to place the Dishingers in a state
awful detainer
--•-ii). % 45 W hen the dust settles in this ca^. .improper result emerges with reasonable clarity I he
Dishingers did not owe as much as Potter thought they
did, but they owed more than they thought they did.
There was no accord and satisfaction, so they are liable
for the shortage. On the other hand, Potter had no right
to demand payment of an amount to which she was not
entitled, so she may not have the lesser amount to
which she was actually entitled trebled, nor is she
entitled to any other relief specially available under the
unlawful detainer statute. Clearly, then, there is no
prevailing party here-each side won a little and lost a
little-so neither side is entitled to an award of attorney
fees.
*\\ 46 On remand, f would simply have the trial court
amend its judgment to reflect the foregoing
(FN I.) From a review of the record it appeai-s that the
Dishingers were paying $18.48 per square foot in
minimum monthly rent at the time they notified
!>
»nor of *heir desire to exercise the option.
(1-N2 ) The Dishingers subtracted $160.19 from the
Uil\ 1, 1996 rental payment for remaining credits
siki premature Consumer Price Index increases
occurring in 1994 and 1995.
(FN3.) The Dishinger's citations to the record
reference the jury's special verdict; the Dishinger's
motion for entry of judgment based on special
verdict; the Dishinger's memorandum in support of
motion for relief from judgment; and the
Dishinger's supplemental memorandum in support
of motion for relief from judgment. In all these
instances the issue of accord and satisfaction was
raised in the trial court.
(FN4.) We note the issue of accord and satisfaction
was not raised in the pleadings. However, Rule
15(b) of the I Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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that issues not raised in 'the pleadings may be tried
by express or implied consent. See Utah R. Civ. P.
15(b). "If an issue is fully tried, a court may decide
the issue and deem the pleadings amended even if
the issue was not originally pleaded." Shinkoskey v.
Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 4^6 n. 2, 19 P.3d
1005 (citingFishery, Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176
(Utah Ct.App.1995) (citation omitted)). "Whether
the pleadings may be deemed amended depends on
whether the opposing party had a fair opportunity to
[prepare and meet the issue). Id (citing Caiman
v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah Ct.App.1987)
). It must be evident from the record that the issue
has been tried., See id, (citing Fisher, 907 P.2d at
1176).
A review of the record reveals that evidence
regarding the existence of an accord and
satisfaction was presented at trial, and the jury was
instructed on and made findings of fact that would
support an accord and satisfaction. Additionally,
the Dishingers argued accord and satisfaction in
their motion for entry of judgment based on special
verdict, which Potter had the opportunity to rebut,
and the trial court entered judgment finding there
was no accord and satisfaction. Thus, because
Potter had the opportunity to prepare and meet the
issue, we conclude that the issue of an accord and
satisfaction, was tried by implication
(FN5.) Although neitlier party has addressed this issue
in their briefs, we note at the outset that the option
provision in the lease is most likely unenforceable
in Utah. It is a well-recognized principle that, "A
condition precedent to the enforcement of any
contract is that there be meeting of the mind of
the parties, which must be spelled out, either
expressly or implicitly, with sufficient definiteness
to be enforced.' Pingree v. Continental Group of
Utah, Inc. 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). Pingree,
'V T Ttab Supreme Court stated,
"a provision for the extension or renewal of a lease
must specify the time the lease is to extend and the
rate to be paid with such a degree of certainty and
definiteness that nothing i.s loll to future
determination. If it falls short of this requirement it
is not enforceable."
Id at 1321 (quoting Slayter v. Pas ley, 199 C)i ,. 616,
264 P.2d 444, 446 (Or. 1953)).
Copyright I U A ^ H
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In the instant case, the lease provided that the rental
rate for the renewal period would be "the then
prevailing rental rate of similar buildings in the
Mam Street area of Park City." On July 1, 1996,
the commencement of the renewal period, the
parties had yet to agree on what constituted "the
then prevailing rental rate of similar buildings in the
Main Street area of Park City." Both parties had
communicated to the other a vastly different rate
and interpretation, and the Dishingers filed a
declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to
interpret the provision. Thus, it cannot be said that
the rate provided for in the option provision of the
lease possesses the certainty and definiteness
required to be enforced. In sum, there was no
meeting of the mmds, and as a result, no agreement.
Therefore, the lease terminated by its own terms as
of July 1, 1996. However, "because we conclude
that an accord and satisfaction occurred, the
unenforceability of the option provision does not
affect our analysis.
**!()_ (FN6.) In response, Potter attempts to rely on.
language froi Tales, Inc. v. Little America
Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975), wherein
our supreme court stated, "Ordinarily, the payment
of part of a debt does not discharge it.... The reason
for this is that in making the part payment, the
debtor is doing nothing more than he is legally
obligated to dc / at 1229. This general
statement is true, to the extent that there is no
"dispute or uncertainty as to the amount due." Id. at
1229-30. In the instant case it is well established
that there is a dispute as to the amount due.
(l*NV.) Because we conclude there was an accord and
satisfaction and thereby reverse the trial court's
' : :s! conclusion that the Dishingers were in
^lawful detainer, we do not address the
Dishinger's alternative argument of waiver and
Potter's cross-appeal regarding the definition of the
term "prevailing rate."
(r;\rt / :>peci> a
shall pay

< M

All costs to supervise and administer said common
areas, used m common by the tenants or occupants
of the building. [S]aid costs shall include such fees
as may be paid to a third party m connection with
same and shall in any event include a tee to
!:,„
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Landlord to supervise and administer same in an
amount equ.i' »•• v.n * L'°.>> .^! f t- total costs of iT)
tb^Ve

\\'W ) Potter does not argue she was entitled to
attorney fees under this provision.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAT BARTHOLOMEW
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Smith,
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Petitioner,
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Grand Canyon Expeditions Co, :
Martin Mathis; Michael Denoyei;
Donald Saunders; John Does 1
through 5; a n d Ja n e D o e s 1
through LJ ,
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Case No. 20010667-SC

ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Permission to
Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed pursuant to Rule 5 of the
Utah R\ iJ es o f A p p e 1 1 ate P r o c e d u r e .
IT IS HEREBY O R D E R E D that the Petition for P e r m i s s i o n to A p p e a l
an I n t e r l o c u t o r y O r d e r filed on August 1 7, 2001 i s granted.

E or Ti le Coi rr t :

^

Date

/

^

^

i

Richard C. Howe
Chief Justice

2 0 5 IS

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on September 2 7, 2001, a ti ue and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the party(ies) listed below:
BENSON L. HATHAWAY
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 S STATE ST STE 1150
PO BOX 810
SALT LAKE CITY NT --I ill
JOHN A. ANDERSON
MATTHEW M. DURHAM
STOEL RIVES LLP
201 S MAIN ST STE 1100
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
SIXTH DISTRICT, RICHFIELD DEPT
ATTN: MARILYN
895 E 300 N
RICHFIELD I IT 84701

By
Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20010667-SC
SIXTH DISTRICT, RICHFIELD DEPT , 940600003
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ADDENDUM

RECEIVED
NOV 16 2001
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
DISTRIC

Rl', KANE COUNT\ , I I'l A11
76 North Main
Kanab, Utah 84741

Telephone (435) 644-2458 Fax: (435) 644-2052

!'» J , \ \ i j ! I! I |l I I I ,

I ID LE 54(1)) CERTIFICATION AND
ENTRY OP .JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case M«: >„ 940600003

GRAND C A N Y O N EXPEDITIONS CO.,
MARTIN M A T H I S ; MICHAEL DENOYER ;
DONALD SAUNDERS;,

Assigned Judge:

K. L. McIFF

Defendant

Thrice this matter has been before the court on summary judgment proceedings and thrice
the court has made legal rulings whuli I. n ." m i " ' ,h ' lll,ii " iinr

* uuniniy lo> " ' j |

The parties have now jointly petitioned the court to enter a final judgment as to the claims
which have been addressed in the court «i lulling

i n'mniijcl icpn'M'-ni iliiiiil lllliii11. ill I r ill i iiiiinist

economical means of resolving a dispute that cannot be settled, They reason, that this will ensure
only on<* ^ ,

-

« ^ thoughtful *onsideration t.ul .w,

*\
J:.I

4

express,, jeutru.
in

ipui.mng its Memorandum Decisions of Jamutn

"'(Mil, i« certified as fin.-i

* j«hontv at Rule ? itb

*\ ^ ^r court
* 1001,

^ < larch JO, 2000 and January : 6

\
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RULE 54(b) Certification and Entry of Judgment, Case number 940600003, Page -2
Dated this

day of August, 2001.

K I,
District C^urt ;.*jbe

CERTIFICATE QF

< v.^p> ui the above was sent to each of the following by "the

On Augusi
method indicated:
Addressee

SERVIC£

I V'fett 1,0(1 fM-mmt, r-lnpwtQft. f^fmS

Benson I ,. Hathaway, Jr.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State Street
Suite 1150
PO Box 810
Salt Lake r

fin]

AdAiih\Stlt

Method

John A, Anderson
STOEL RIVES
One Utah Center
20lMain Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, I JT 84 ill

[IB]

n
ifciu.^1 i ^ W j L ^

H;\home\CON€VfO>lviMCCFF\KANE\SmwhvOr*n(l.RuleS4
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STOEL RIVES LLP
John A. Anderson (4464)
Matthew M. Durham (6214)
201 Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3131
Attorneys for Defendants
• " : IIIDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPOR"I « >(•
lOINT MOTION FOR
! ~.UK\ rFRTTFl" \ ] '( M

i. * v
•. - i VJN EXPEDITIONS CO.;
MAR UN \1 A THIS; MICHAEL
DENOYHR; DONALD SAUNDERS;
JOHN IX )ES 1 through 5; and JANE
DOES 1 through 5,

Civil No. 940600003

Defendants.

Plaintiff and defendants submit the following points and authorities in support of their
joint motion for Rule 54(b) certification.
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INTRODUCTION
This court already is aware of the procedural historj vi mio case. ,,^ ..a.,
K)f

memorandum decisions have granted summary judgment

in favor of defendants on plaintiffs wrongful termination claim,., on his breach of implied
co\ eiiaiit of good faith a nd fail dealii ig claii n as it relates to his emplo) ment contract with Grand
Canyon and on plaintiffs breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim based
on i ric iJu-

c . Agreement excepl to Ilk i \tcnl il iu\ i, >L es lL Ai i ^ wii.i Niimsemeiil l.i< kfund

issue. The court has also granted summary judgment on plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages
and for attorneys' fees as consequential damages. The court denied nummary ju.iginu
ii •

'

e

ne Arizona Amusementlax question, i mail\. the co-m h.ia denied

plaintifi lea\ e U) amend to assert a claim for unjust enrichment arising i -ui -i UK \nzona
r

:-..

• •

I

. I

••

;

Plaintiff and defendants stipulated to continue the trial date based upon their agreement
that they would seek Rule > 1(h) 4 ulilicahon ul .ill issues appn piuh1 I' i MII tt r.'itifh'ali' n nil
file a joint petition tor inh-rloeutc-rv appeal on all remaining issues that were not appropriate for
Rule 54(b) certitication

. iu panics nave prepared a petition for intei loci ltoi > appeal (the

"Petition") which they have filed contemporanc >u,\h with this motion. The Petition may be
conditioned upon this court certifying the issues described below pursuant to 1 • ... : e 'ei it tl: i,e cc i u t grai its 54(b) certification but the court of appeals denies the petition lot interlocutor}' appeal, the parties will seek to stay the 54(b) appeal pending trial of all remaining issues.

SaltLake-138286.1 0033714-00001
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ARGUMENT
1.

The Claims for Which Plaintiff and Defendants Seek Rule 54fb) Certification Are
Appropriate for Such Certification to the Utah Supreme Court.

Rule 54(b) provides that the court's prior memorandum decisions are not final orders as
they do not dispose of all claims for relief against all parties. See, e.g., Bradbury v. Valencia,
2000 UT 50, 5 P.3d 649, 651 (Utah 2000). Rule 54(b) also provides, however, that where more
than one claim for relief is present in an action and/or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims of
the parties upon certain conditions. Rule 54(b), Utah R. Civ. P. (2000). Those conditions are
that the court make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and expressly
direct the entry of judgment. Id
The court was fully advised of the grounds upon which plaintiff and defendants jointly
sought continuance of the trial date. The parties then agreed, and still agree, that the most
economical means of resolving a dispute that obviously will not be settled is to have all issues
heard by the appropriate appellate court as soon as reasonably practicable. This will result in no
trial at all, if the appellate court agrees with defendants, or a single trial, in the event the court
agrees with the plaintiff. A failure to certify the case for immediate appeal will result in a trial of
a single issue, an appeal of multiple issues beyond those tried, and possibly another trial of
different issues. This result would plainly be inefficient for the reasons earlier discussed with the
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court. Accordingly, this court may find that there is no just reason for delay, and certify as final
its July 30, 2001 Order incorporating its Memorandum Decisions dated January 15, 1999,
March 20, 2000, and January 26, 2001.
DATED this

day of August, 2001.
STOEL RIVES, LLP

John A. Anderson
Attorneys for Defendants
DATED this I $* day of August, 2001.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY

Benson L. Hathaway,y
Attorneys for Plainti

2036
SaltLake-138286.1 0033714-00001

STOEL RIVES LLP
John A. Anderson (4464)
Matthew M. Durham (6214)
201 Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3131
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,

JOINT MOTION FOR
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION

vs.
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.;
MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL
DENOYER; DONALD SAUNDERS;
JOHN DOES 1 through 5; and JANE
DOES 1 through 5,

Civil No. 940600003
Hon. K. L. Mclff

Defendants.

Plaintiff and defendants hereby jointly move pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, for certification of the court's order dated July 30, 2001, incorporating its
memorandum decisions dated January 15, 1999, March 20, 2000, and January 26, 2001, as
follows:
1.

For a certification of finality of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs wrongful

termination claim;
SaltLake-138283.1 0033714-00001
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2.

For a certification of finality of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs claim for

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising out of his employment
relationship with defendant Grand Canyon Expeditions Company.
The grounds for this motion are set forth in the accompanying joint memorandum of
points and authorities. Plaintiff and defendants further represent to the court that they have
prepared a petition for interlocutory appeal of all issues on which the court has either granted or
denied summary judgment but for which Rule 54(b) certification is unavailable. Those issues
include those portions of the prior memorandum decisions granting summary judgment on the
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim arising out of the Buy-Sell
Agreement, together with plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages and attorneys' fees as
consequential damages, as well as the court's denial of defendants' motions for summary
judgment on all grounds asserted in support of that claim, denial of defendants' motion to
dismiss the individual defendants, and denial of plaintiff s motion for leave to amend.
DATED this

day of August, 2001.
STOEL RIVES, LLP

John A. Anderson
Attorneys for Defendants
DATED this

fy

day of August, 2001.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY

Benson L. Hathaway, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SaltLake-13 8283.1 0033714-00001
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RECEIVED
AUG - 2 2001 ^
STIR6A & HATHAWAY

«LH>

tfAMPrni.MT.

BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4138)
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS
CO., MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL
DENOYER, RONALD R. SMITH,
DONALD SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES
1 through 5 and JANE DOES 1
through 5,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Civil No. 940600003
Judge Kay McKiff

Defendants.

Defendants' Third Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court for hearing on
November 20, 2000. Defendants filed two previous motions for summary judgment, and Plaintiff
filed a previous Motion to Amend, which were fully briefed, argued and addressed in memorandum
decisions on January 15,1999 and March 20, 2000. No prior memorandum decision of the Court
has been reduced to an order. After hearing the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the
pleadings and documents of record supporting and opposing Defendants' Third Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Court ruled from the bench granting the Defendants' Third Motion in part
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and denying it in part. Subsequently, upon the request of both parties, the Court took the matter
under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision on January 26, 2001, incorporating its
January 15, 1999 and March 20, 2000 memorandum decisions.
For the reasons set forth in this Court's January 15,1999, March 20, 2000, and January 26,
2001 Memorandum Decisions, which three Memorandum Decisions are fully incorporated in this
Order, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend its Complaint is denied.

2.

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted as to all of Plaintiffs

claims, with the exception of Plaintiff s claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to the extent it pertains to Defendants' treatment of the Arizona amusement tax refund.
DATED this «-A->>day of June, 2001.
BY THE COURT

Honorable K. L. Mclff
Sixth District Court Judge
Approved as
STOI
JOHN A. ANDERSON
Attorndv for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this frl^y of June, 2001,1 caused to be served a true copy
of the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by
the method indicated below, to the following:
John A. Anderson
STOEL RIVES
Attorney for Defendants
201 South Main Street Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-4904

C) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(^Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
() Facsimile

C:\MyFiles\SMITH\msj.order.wpd
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On r /*/, 2000, a copy of the above ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was sent to each of the following by the method indicated:
Addressee

Method (Mail, Person. Fax) Addressee

Benson Hathaway
215 South State Sti
Street Suite 1150
P OO Box 810
Salt Lake City Ut 84110 0810

y\

Method (Mail, Person. Fax)

John A Anderson
210 South Main Street Suite 1100
Salt Lake City Ut 84111 4904

f ip

fWLjferYtfALA
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8$

^o^O
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4138)
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810
Telephone: (801) 364-8300

mm
Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
SUBSTITUTE PARTIES

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS
CO., MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL
DENOYER, RONALD R. SMITH,
DONALD SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES
1 through 5 and JANE DOES 1
through 5,

Civil No. 940600003
Judge Kay McKiff

Defendants.

Based on the Motion of Plaintiff pursuant to Utah R.Civ. P. 25(a), the death of Defendant
Donald A. Saunders, and for other good cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Glen Perez, the personal representative of
the Estate of Donald A. Saunders, and the estate of Donald A. Saunders are hereby substituted as
a Defendants, in the stead of Defendant Donald Saunders
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DATED this l^>

day ofFcbroaryr 2001.
BY THE COURT

By:
The Honoj?
Sixth District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this typ day of February, 2001,1 caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE
PARTIES, by the method indicated below, to the following:
John A. Anderson
STOEL RIVES
Attorney for Defendants
201 South Main Street Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-4904

Q U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(tyiiand Delivered
() Overnight Mail
() Facsimile

C:\MyFiles\SMITH\substituteparties.order.wpd
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RECEIVED
JAN 2 9 2 0 0 1 '
STfflBA* HATHAWAY

DISTRICT COURT, KANE COUNTY, UTAH
76 North Main
Kanab,, Utah 84741
Telephone: (435) 644-2458 Fax: (435) 644-2052

MARC SMITH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Defendants' Third Summary
Judgment Motion)

Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 940600003

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.,
MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL DENOYER,
DONALD SAUNDERS,

Assigned Judge: K. L. McIFF

Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
The Court has now heard three summary judgment motions filed by defendants. The first
resulted in a Memorandum Decision dated January 15, 1999. The second resulted in a
Memorandum Decision dated March 20, 2000. The Court incorporates both of those decisions
herein including the recitation of facts. As a result of these prior rulings, plaintiffs remaining
cause of action is limited to a claimed breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Moreover, the Court has heretofore narrowed this claim so there are only two areas of potential
recovery. One relates to a large tax refund received from the State of Arizona after plaintiffs
forced departure, and the second relates to the manner in which the corporate defendant
accounted for and valued certain assets included in the involuntary buyout.
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Memorandum Decision, Case number 940600003, Page 2 DEFENDANT'S THIRD SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
In their third summary judgment motion, defendants argue that the same reasoning
heretofore employed by the Court warrants summary judgement with respect to the remaining
claims.
In the event the Court does not grant complete summary judgment, defendants seek to
further narrow the litigation. Specifically they seek dismissal of plaintiffs claim for punitive
damages and also the claim for attorneys' fees as an element of consequential damages.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. SobekAVhitewater Accounting
In August of 1990, defendant Grand Canyon Expeditions, Co. (hereafter Grand Canyon)
reached an agreement for purchase of SobekAVhitewater assets which included personal property
and a concession contract authorizing a "whitewater" operation in the Grand Canyon. This
acquisition was not finalized until some 13 months later in September of 1991.
Because of the close temporal proximity to plaintiffs forced departure in July of 1992,
and because the facts were not previously fully developed, the Court concluded that there were
issues of fact as to whether accounting decisions were influenced by plaintiffs impending
departure. Specifically, the Court was concerned that depreciation schedules and the allocation of
values to various components of the SobekAVhitewater purchase could have been manipulated to
result in lesser compensation to the plaintiff.
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Memorandum Decision, Case number 940600003, Page 3 It now appears clear that these accounting decisions were made prior to and completely
uninfluenced by plaintiffs departure. The rupture and forced buyout of the stock all occurred
during the month of July 1992, whereas the accounting decisions were made during the late fall of
1991 and early spring of 1992. Moreover, they were essentially consistent with and in no event
less advantageous to plaintiff than accounting practices and decisions made during the entire
history of the corporation dating to its inception in 1986.
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would support afindingby the trier of fact that
the accounting methodology employed with respect to the Sobek/Whitewater acquisition was
influenced in any manner by plaintiffs forced exit.
The Court must therefore conclude that the accord reached between the parties during
July 1992, as reflected in plaintiffs resignation and a settlement agreement, bar any claim arising
from the Sobek/Whitewater transaction. There is simply no basis to give the latter separate
treatment.
B. The Arizona Tax Refund
The sole area left open for trial relates to a large tax refund received from the State of
Arizona. The relevant facts are really quite simple and have been discussed in both of the Court's
prior memorandum decisions. At the time of the settlement by these parties in July of 1992, there
was outstanding a million dollar tax refund claim lodged with the State of Arizona The president
of defendant Grand Canyon had told counsel to abandon the claim. Counsel disregarded this
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Memorandum Decision, Case number 940600003, Page 4 directive and purposely left the claim open under the express belief that it might ultimately be
successful.1 Three years later it was successful and the corporation received a refund which was
greater than the entire value of the corporation on which plaintiffs buy-out was premised.
At the time plaintiff met with the corporate president in July of 1992 and reached a
settlement, apparently neither was aware that the tax refund claim was being purposely kept alive
by the corporation's counsel.2 It may be safely assumed that at some subsequent point the
corporate president and other officials became aware of and cooperated with the effort to obtain
and retain the refund. It did not just show up one day in the mail.

The affidavit of corporate attorney Ann M. Dumenil unequivocally acknowledges purposely keeping
the refund claim alive both before and after plaintiffs forced departure:
Before Departure
13- . . . I did not formally withdraw Grand Canyon's request, however, because I thought another
rafting company might someday successfully challenge the transaction privilege tax; consequently, I
believed that leaving Grand Canyon's request pending would be beneficial to Grand Canyon because they
might be able to argue that they were entitled to a refund.
After Departure
17- I again made the determination that it was in Grand Canyon's best interest not to formally withdraw
the request, but rather merely to cancel its hearing and wait to see if another company successfully
challenged the tax. . . .
18- the transaction privilege tax was subsequently challenged successfully by a another river rafting
company in an appeal before the Arizona Supreme Court reported as Wilderness World, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1995).

In its second memorandum decision, the Court discussed possible imputation of knowledge to the
president. Defendants insist that if the corporation or its president is charged with the knowledge of its attorney, it
must also be imputed to the plaintiff who was a corporate official. The argument is flawed. Plaintiff was being
forced out. It was an adversarial setting. To suggest that he should be treated as a corporate official in this context
flies in the face of reason. The corporation stood to gain everything and plaintiff nothing by keeping the refund
effort alive and by secreting it from the plaintiff. That is exactly what happened.
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Memorandum Decision, Case number 940600003, Page 5The simplicity of the facts belies the difficulty of the legal inquiry. The peculiar facts lend
support to the Restatement's observation that "A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is
impossible." §205, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Comment d (1981). As the process
unfolded, the corporate officials moved from a status of misinformation to awareness and on to
active pursuit and recovery. In such circumstances, were they justified in stone cold silence
toward plaintiff? Is there a legitimate legal basis for arguing that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing reached far enough to require that plaintiff be advised that the facts were different than the
parties supposed and that recovery was being pursued? When the million dollars came, were
defendants entitled to pocket the same without any disclosure or obligation to plaintiff? These
questions probe the outer limits of the doctrine in question.
Utah courts have embraced § 205 of the Restatement which provides "every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement." See, e.g., St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 1994,
200 (Utah 1991). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be summarized as follows:
The covenant requires honesty in fact. § 205, Comment a (1981). In some instances, it may
require more than honesty. Id, Comment d. It can relate to acts or omissions. Id. Under the
covenant parties impliedly promise that they will not intentionally or purposely do anything or fail
to do anything which will injury the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract. St.
Benedicts, at 199. To comply with the covenant, the parties7 actions must be consistent with the
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Memorandum Decision, Case number 940600003, Page 6agreed common purpose of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the other party to the
contract. Id. Moreover, it has been held that breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is a fact issue usually left for determination by the jury. Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp.,
883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah App. 1994); Western Farm CreditBankv. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 380
(Utah App. 1993). The jury is obliged to consider the language of the contract documents and
the course of dealing and conduct of the parties, but, as stated in St. Benedict's, "an examination
of express contract terms alone is insufficient to determine whether there has been a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." At 200.
Defendants freely acknowledge that they have received an enormous windfall but deny any
responsibility to plaintiff. They suggest that the governing principles are strictly legal and that
fairness and equity have no place. They urge that the tax refund claim was contingent - not a
"bookable asset" - and therefore irrelevant in the forced buyout.
While it is true that contractual rights are generally legal rather than equitable, that does
not mean that equity and fairness are completely foreign to the field. See 27A Am Jur 2d, Equity
§ 164, page 561 (1996). As the words employed to describe the doctrine suggest, the "duty of
good faith and fair dealing" is firmly rooted in notions of equity and fairness. The obligation
arises by implication rather than by contractual expression. As previously noted, it is sometimes
necessary to look beyond the express contract terms. St. Benedict's, at 200. The mere fact that
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Memorandum Decision, Case number 940600003, Page 7the tax refund claim was not labeled a "bookable asset" is not solely determinative of relevancy,
nor of whether the duty of good faith and fair dealing has been breeched.
As this litigation now stands, plaintiff thinks this Court has gone too far in limiting his
potential remedy and defendants think the court has not gone far enough. Defendants argue that
the resignation and settlement documents constitute complete waivers and give rise to complete
defenses irrespective of the equities and the fact that the negotiating parties were unaware that the
claim for refund was being kept alive and that it ultimately produced an enormous windfall.
Plaintiffs counsel, on the other hand, claims that his client should now be able to go
behind the settlement documents, not just as it relates to the Arizona tax refund which was not
treated in any manner, but to upset the determination of "book value" on which the buy-out of
plaintiffs stock was based. He claims that it was the common purpose and the reasonable
expectation of the parties that plaintiff receive the "real value" rather than the "book value" of his
stock and that the latter has been unduly and inappropriately impacted by accounting procedures
over the years that have been designed for "tax purposes." His expert witness acknowledged that
the approach of the corporate accountant in dealing with expenses, depreciation, purchase price
allocations, etc., though "aggressive," was nonetheless within the range of generally accepted
accounting principles. This does not satisfy plaintiff. Even though he benefitted from this
accounting approach for a number of years and even though he agreed upon and executed a
settlement document relying upon the values fixed by the corporate accountant, he now claims
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Memorandum Decision, Case number 940600003, Page 8that the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires that the corporate accountant start anew from
the inception of the corporation, re-evaluate all transactions, reallocate the purchase price,
recalculate depreciation schedules and revisit treatment of expenses to see if they were
appropriate. He opines that only in this way can the "real value" of the corporation be determined
resulting in fair treatment to him in the buy-out.
Plaintiff not only disregards the history of the corporation but what happened in the
buyout. When the rupture occurred, plaintiff met with the corporate president. They talked.
They negotiated. Concessions were made. They agreed upon additional consideration for
plaintiff. Documents were prepared. Plaintiff had them for several days before signing. Both
parties signed. The agreed-upon payments were made for a year and a half before plaintiff filed
suit. Moreover, the payments were not at "book value" but at 140% of book value as required by
the buy/sell and settlement agreements. This waters down plaintiffs claim that "real value" has
been completely ignored. There is too much meaning in this history and the settlement documents
to allow them to be disregarded.
After thoughtful consideration and reconsideration, this Court has concluded and now
reconcludes that the basic value matters were resolved and merged into the settlement documents.
This has been extensively discussed in the Court's two prior memorandum decisions. The sole
exception to all of this relates to the Arizona tax refund which simply was not discussed nor
contemplated when the settlement documents were prepared and executed and is entirely beyond
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Memorandum Decision, Case number 940600003, Page 9thefixingof values by the accountant. When this oversight was discovered and the refund
materialized, defendants' only response was to pocket the money. It was not until late in the
litigation that the disclosures regarding the Arizona tax refund were forthcoming.
A jury could reasonably conclude that defendants' acts and /or omissions were
inconsistent with common purposes and reasonable expectations. As such they may fail to
comply with the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff ought to have the opportunity to
make that case to the jury whose right it is to resolve the issue of breach.
C. Punitive Damages
Plaintiffs sole remaining claim is for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
This claim sounds in contract rather than in tort. St Benedict's, at 199. It is well established that
punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract. Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick,
664 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Utah 1983). Moreover, there is an absence of alleged facts which come
close to the egregious facts required to support a punitive damage claim. If the trial in this matter
produces an appropriate foundation, the Court could always revisit this ruling.
D. Attorney Fees as Consequential Damages
In Canyon Country Store v. Braceyt 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court
allowed recovery of attorney fees as consequential damages in an action for breach of an
insurance contract. The contract did not provide for attorney fees and they were incurred in the
context of first-party rather than third-party litigation. The court acknowledged departure from
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Memorandum Decision, Case number 940600003, Page 10the well-established rule that attorney fees generally can not be recovered unless provided for by
statute or by contract.
The result in Bracey was analyzed by the Court of Appeals in Collier v. Heinz, 827 P.2d
982 (Utah App. 1992). The Heinz court noted that Bracey went beyond the previously
recognized exception that allowed attorneys fees as foreseeable consequential damages only
where the injured party incurred attorney fees through litigation with a third party.
The Heinz court resolved what it termed "a problematic conflict" by concluding that athe
award of attorney fees as consequential damages, outside the context of statutory and contractual
authorization, should be limited to . . . two situations . . . : insurance contracts and the third-party
exception." At 984. The opinion seems to have been an effort to "tidy-up" and leave the
precedential footprint clean. It was not to be.
The ink was barely dry on the Heinz decision when the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). The Heslop court added another
exception, i.e., employment termination cases.3 A former bank employee was able to recover
attorney fees as consequential damages for wrongful termination by the bank.

3

It may not be conceptually accurate to think only in terms of "exception" categories. It may be more
appropriate to examine the relative strength of the claims and defenses and the disparity of strength in the
relationship. A clear disparity of strength exists between an insurer and its insured, and between an employer and
an employee. Depending upon the circumstances, it could also exist in cases such as this where a minority owner
lacks any bargaining strength in a forced buyout.
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Memorandum Decision, Case number 940600003, Page 11It is by no means certain that development of the law in this area is at an end. However, it
is worth noting that Heinz and Heslop were decided in 1992 and there does not appear to be any
subsequent cases that have treated the subject or identified any new areas of exception to the
general rule. Plaintiff argues that this Court should venture into the unknown and defendant
argues that should only be done by the Supreme Court.
Given the prior rulings herein and the nature of the limited claim which remains, it is this
Court's view that the facts are not of sufficient strength to warrant departure from the general
rule. If the evidence at trial dictates otherwise, the matter can be revisited.
CONCLUSION
Having declined to grant summary judgment as to all claims, trial herein shall go forward.
GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY.
Dated this ^\£?day of January, 2001.

K. iTMcIff)
District Court Judge
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Mr. Benson Hathaway
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STOEL RIVES LLP
John A. Anderson (4464)
Matthew M. Durham (6214)
201 Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3131
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SDCTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
ANN M. DUMENIL

v.
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS
CO., MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL
DENOYER; DONALD SAUNDERS;
JOHN DOES 1 through 5; and JANE
DOES 1 through 5,

Civil No. 940600003
Hon. K. L. Mclff

Defendants.

STATE OF ARIZONA

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF MARICOPA )
Ann M. Dumenil, having been first sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona, over the age of majority, and

otherwise competent to make this affidavit.
2.

I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Arizona; I am

associated with the law firm of Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, P.L.C., in Phoenix, Arizona.
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3.

In 1990, Jennings, Strouss & Salmon was retained by Grand Canyon

Expeditions Co. ("Grand Canyon") to represent it in connection with a dispute with the
Arizona Department of Revenue (" ADOR") over Grand Canyon's payment of certain use taxes
to the state of Arizona.
4.

The ADOR was attempting to collect from Grand Canyon taxes for food

purchased outside Arizona, but brought into that state during river trips.
5.

In December 1990,1 sent Michael R. Denoyer, President of Grand Canyon, a

draft Notice of Protest and Request for Refund (the "Notice of Protest") for filing with the
ADOR. (A copy of the draft Notice of Protest, along with my letter to Mr. Denoyer is
attached to Grand Canyon's Supporting Memorandum as Exhibit "I.")
6.

The draft Notice of Protest was intended to challenge the assessment of the use

tax mentioned above; it also, however, requested a refund of a transaction privilege (sales) tax
in the amusement classification under Arizona state tax laws. See Supp. Mem. Ex. "I."
7.

Although Grand Canyon had not requested that I include the request for a refund

of the transaction privilege tax, I had prepared such a request for Grand Canyon's predecessor
and included it in Grand Canyon's request. I believed the request was advisable because other
taxpayers in Arizona, including the owner of Grand Canyon's predecessor, were challenging
the tax or defending other audits by the ADOR. Id*
8.

I explained in my letter that, although I did not believe Grand Canyon would

actually prevail on the transaction privilege tax refund, the request was strategically advisable
because it could serve as a bargaining offset of approximately $21,000 on Grand Canyon's
protest of the use tax. IdL
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9.

On July 15, 1991,1 wrote to advise Grand Canyon of the status of the Notice of

Protest. See Letter of Ann M. Dumenil to Michael R. Denoyer, July 15, 1991 (attached to
Grand Canyon's Supporting Memorandum as Exhibit "J.").
10.

In my July 15 letter, I told Grand Canyon that although it was possible that

some river rafting company might successfully challenge the transaction privilege tax in
Arizona, such a challenge would take years to resolve. Moreover, I explained that ADOR was
taking the position that since the costs of the tax were passed on to Grand Canyon's customers,
the refund would not be made to Grand Canyon, even if Grand Canyon were technically
entitled to such a refund. Id^
11.

I asked if Grand Canyon desired to continue litigating the question of the

transaction privilege tax as it would involve significant time, expense and risk. Id^
12.

On August 21, 1991, Mr. Denoyer called me to say that Grand Canyon did not

want to continue litigating the transaction privilege issue.
13.

Pursuant to Grand Canyon's instruction, I allowed their request to lapse; I did

not formally withdraw Grand Canyon's request, however, because I thought another rafting
company might someday successfully challenge the transaction privilege tax; consequently, I
believed that leaving Grand Canyon's request pending would be beneficial to Grand Canyon
because they might be able to argue that they were entitled to a refund.
14.

I did not specifically advise Grand Canyon that I had not formally withdrawn its

refund request until August 20, 1992, when I sent a letter to Mr. Denoyer explaining my
decision and its rationale. I also advised Mr. Denoyer that a hearing had been scheduled on
the request for refund of the transaction privilege tax. Letter of Ann M. Dumenil to Michael
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R. Denoyer, August 20, 1992 (attached to Grand Canyon's Supporting Memorandum as
Exhibit "K.")
15.

In my August 20, 1992 letter I explained to Grand Canyon that I did not believe

it was likely to prevail on this issue, and asked again whether Grand Canyon wanted to pursue
the matter. IdL
16.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Denoyer told me that Grand Canyon did not wish to

pursue the request for a refund of transaction privilege taxes and asked me to withdraw Grand
Canyon's request.
17.

I again made the determination that it was in Grand Canyon's best interest not to

formally withdraw the request, but rather merely to cancel its hearing and wait to see if
another company successfully challenged the tax. Accordingly, I canceled the hearing on
Grand Canyon's request for refund, although I did not specifically explain this to Grand
Canyon at the time. <ke Handwritten Notes on Memorandum of August 25, 1992 (attached to
Grand Canyon's Supporting Memorandum as Exhibit "L.").
18.

The transaction privilege tax was subsequently challenged successfully by a

another river rafting company in an appeal before the Arizona Supreme Court reported as
Wilderness World. Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1995).
19.

On September 13, 1995, I sent Grand Canyon a copy of my 1992 memo

(Exhibit "0") to file memorializing a call from Mike Denoyer in which he said he did not want
to pursue any refund claim.
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20.

I wrote on this memo a note indicating that it was fortuitous that I did not

withdraw the refund claim, but had only canceled Grand Canyon's hearing on the matter, since
that left Grand Canyon eligible for a refund. See Supp. Mem. Ex. "L."
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DATED this otC> day of March, 1999.

LJ/HM<mwjm(i/YuA

Ann M. Dumenil

UL
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ^ _ day of March, 1999.

2-^
Notary PuW ^
Residing at: Jfci

E Ac*/?

\ t ft-a

^ C-U
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RECEIVED
APR 1 5 2000
STiRBA 4 HATHAWAY

DISTRICT COURT, KANE COUNTY, UTAH

°0u$«*

76 North Main
Kanab
Telephone: (435) 644-2458 Fax: (435) 644-2052

MARC SMITH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

Case No. 940600003
Assigned Judge: K. L. McIFF

vs.
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO ;
MARTIN MATfflS; MICHAEL DENOYER;
DONALD SAUNDERS;,
Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on the following motions.
1- Defendants'motion for summary judgment;
2- Defendants' motion to exclude testimony of plaintiffs expert,
3- Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend.
Each motion has been extensively briefed and argued. After careful consideration, the
Court has determined to deny each of the motions; however, in so doing the Court has narrowed
the areas which remain viable and concerning which proof will be permitted. The reasoning
behind the Court's decision is briefly summarized hereafter, though no effort has been made to
cite legal authority for well-established principles. The exhaustive briefing has supplied more than
ample authority for the Court's conclusions of law. Rather the Court has focused on sharing with
the parties its view of the issues with which the jury will be obliged to grapple.
1721

MEMORANDUM DECISION, Case number 940600003, Page 2 I begin by noting that plaintiff was forced out of a closely held corporation. There were
five shareholders. Plaintiff owned 17.66% of the outstanding stock. Under the buy/sell
agreement entered into at inception, three of the shareholders, including plaintiff, were obliged to
sell their stock upon termination of employment, whether voluntary or involuntary. At the time of
his involuntary termination, a buyout agreement was reduced to writing and signed by plaintiff
and the corporate president. In reliance on this agreement the Court previously granted partial
summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs claim of an entitlement to continued employment.
This ruling left only plaintiffs claimed breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. With
respect to this claim, the Court stated:
The duty of good faith and fair dealing applies not only to the original agreements between
these parties, but would have extended to the termination proceedings and the manner of
accounting and fixing values. And this is so even though the buy-sell agreement accorded
'conclusive status' to the value determined by the accountant. The conclusive status of
these values necessarily presumes the absence of a breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing.
After revisiting all the pleadings, including the extensive briefing and massive amount of
supporting material filed of late, the Court remains convinced that the statement above quoted
essentially outlines the proper areas for trial. An effort has been made hereafter to add sufficient
substance and detail so that the parties may know how to proceed.
It is the Court's considered view that the duty of good faith and fair dealing has both
negative and affirmative components. The former prevents the doing of anything in bad faith or
with intent to injure. The latter, in the right circumstances, may require affirmative acts which are
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MEMORANDUM DECISION, Case number 940600003, Page 3 reasonable and faithful to an agreed common purpose and consistent with justified expectations. I
consider this view to be supported by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS
which has been adopted by Utah Courts. It is not a sufficient defense that defendant's did not
intentionally injure plaintiff or intentionally engage in acts of bad faith.
With the foregoing in mind, I will proceed to examine the potential application of the
doctrine requiring good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff asserts that in the beginning the corporate
accountant used inappropriate accounting procedures which at the time of the buyout unfairly
compromised the value of his stock. A major difficulty with this position is that the accounting
method in question was developed when no dispute existed between the parties. It was employed
for some six years before a dispute arose. The benefits and burdens of the approach have been
enjoyed by all participants and there has been no evidence proffered to the effect that it was
inconsistent with their contemporaneous common purposes or reasonable expectations.
Moreover, the evidence before the Court supports the conclusion that in the absence of
competing positions the accounting procedures were within the broad range of what might be
considered "generally accepted accounting procedures". This early part of the business
relationship between the parties is a closed chapter.
The foregoing reasoning does not apply with equal force to the accounting procedures
employed at or around the time of the buyout when the relationship had ruptured. Plaintiff has
challenged the handling of some matters at this time, including the corporation's accounting
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MEMORANDUM DECISION, Case number 940600003, Page 4 methodology in acquisition of another business. Some of the potential disputes in this area may
evaporate in the light of further examination of relevant information by the parties and their
accountants, but to the extent that a dispute remains, it is the proper subject of inquiry at trial.
Once the rupture occurred and the buyout triggered, the natural loyalty of the corporate
accountant (as opposed to the broader duty owed all shareholders) would have run to defendants.
Plaintiff would have been viewed as an outsider. The relationship was adversarial. This is not
analogous to the situation six years earlier when all parties were essentially in the same boat. I
conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs expert is entitled to address the appropriateness of accounting
procedures employed at or near the time of the buyout when the parties were at odds. At that
time it may not be a complete defense that the methodology employed comports with "generally
accepted accounting principles". In briefing and at oral argument, both sides agreed that the
inherent flexibility in accounting principles make them analogous to a line rather than a dot on a
line. The duty of good faith and fair dealing may well influence the acceptable position on the line
consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties.
I turn now to the matter of the Arizona tax refund. The salient facts are these. The tax
was collected from third persons. It was collected in its entirety and paid to the State of Arizona
while plaintiff was a shareholder. It came back to the corporation in 1995 and 1996 some three
plus years after plaintiffs departure. Plaintiff did not become aware of the refund until 1998 and
the extent of the refund was not disclosed to him until some time in 1999. The dollar figures are
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MEMORANDUM DECISION, Case number 940600003, Page 5revealing. Plaintiff was forced to sell his stock based upon a net book value for the entire
corporation of some $730,000. The tax refund relating entirely to the time covered by plaintiffs
ownership was approximately $1,000,000. Of the one million dollars received, defendants were
theoretically required to return $280,000 to the original payers, but apparently this has proved at
least somewhat impossible. The bottom line is that the corporate defendant received and
distributed to its then existing shareholders an amount which exceeds the total value of the
corporation which was employed to compute the value of the plaintiffs stock in the forced
buyout.1
It is my considered view that a jury could reasonably conclude that there is a lack of equity
and fairness in the scenario outlined and that it violates what the parties could have reasonably
expected from each other. The two suggested remedies are unjust enrichment and breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants claim plaintiff cannot prove the essential elements
of a claim of unjust enrichment. Specifically, they argue that plaintiff has not conferred any
benefit on defendant; rather the benefit was conferred by third parties to whom a refund is either
not required or impractical. Defendants freely acknowledge the windfall, but claim plaintiff is not
entitled to any credit. Rather than get in that quagmire, the Court has determined that the better
remedy is to allow the jury to consider whether plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of
participation based on the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Equity and justice are as central to
1

Some monies may still be held in a retained earmngs account, but this will likely not change the
ultimate economics or equities.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION, Case number 940600003, Page 6this claim as they are to a claim of unjust enrichment. The defense claims that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing is unavailable because there is no evidence of an intent to injure and no
evidence of bad faith conduct. The Court views this as an excessively narrow construction of the
duty; and of equal importance, the Court believes defendants have disregarded important facts
surrounding the preservation of and ultimate recovery under the claim against the State of
Arizona.
More specifically, defendants' claim that when the corporate president signed the buyout
agreement with plaintiff, he was unaware that the tax refund claim was still viable. The president
had directed counsel to dismiss the claim, but this direction was disobeyed. The corporation
seeks to insulate itself against a claimed breach of good faith by drawing a line between corporate
officials and the attorney whom the corporation had retained to represent its interest in the State
of Arizona. The line is too fine for this Court. Based upon the affidavit of the Arizona attorney,
it appears clear that the potential of obtaining a tax refund was deliberately kept open from
August 1991 through the buyout of plaintiffs stock in July of 1992, and on through 1995 and
1996 when the tax refund ultimately came. The attorney's affidavit indicates that she declined to
follow the directive of the corporate president to withdraw the request, opting instead to simply
cancel hearings, thereby leaving the request intact. She states unequivocally that she deliberately
made these decisions believing that it was in the best interest of the corporation and that it might
ultimately be able to obtain a refund. The Court is unwilling to allow the defendant to draw a line
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MEMORANDUM DECISION, Case number 940600003, Page 7between corporate officials and the corporate attorney when answering plaintiffs claim, while at
the same time holding on to the benefits derived from the course deliberately pursued by the
attorney.
At oral argument defendants suggested that they may have been entitled to receive the
refund even if the attorney would not have disobeyed directions and kept the claim alive. The
Court does not consider that controlling.2 The fact remains that the corporate attorney, by
conscious design, kept alive a claim which ultimately resulted in recovery of an amount exceeding
the entire remaining value of the corporation. This overlapped the period of the buyout and was
not disclosed to the plaintiff in any manner. Moreover, if the facts are as the defendants allege, to
wit, the corporate officials were also in the dark, then all of the parties (save only the attorney)
were negotiating without full knowledge of the facts at the time of the buyout. This posture
continued until near the time the refund was received. After that, it was only the plaintiff that
remained in the dark, a posture which continued until the latter stages of this litigation. If the
knowledge of the attorney is imputable to the corporate president, then there was a unilateral
mistake of fact on plaintiffs part coupled with "sharp practices" by the other negotiating party. If
the knowledge is not imputable, then there was a mutual mistake by the negotiating parities.

2

Apparently the Arizona legislature granted relief to the "river running" companies, including the
defendant Grand Canyon Expeditions (GCE). Presumably there were enough companies similarly situated to urge
successful passages of favorable legislation. GCE may not have been active and it may not have tipped the scales,
but it would be indefensibly speculative to assume that it or any other similarly situated player was irrelevant to the
outcome. The old saying applies: "There is strength in numbers."
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MEMORANDUM DECISION, Case number 940600003, Page 8Either way, a jury could well conclude that there has been a breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing. This, it has been held, is a factual inquiry generally inappropriate for decisions as a
matter of law.
I address one other matter relating to expert testimony. The parties argued at length as to
how the corporate accountant should have treated the tax refund; whether it should be labeled a
"prior period adjustment" or simply considered income for the period in which it was received.3 I
do not consider this to be the controlling issue. The duty of good faith and fair dealing has more
to do with the reasonable expectations of the parties than it does with accounting procedures.
Defendants ask the rhetorical question, "What if there would have been a tax liability, would there
have been an expectation of liability on plaintiffs part?" Defendants will have to pitch that
question to the jury. It is more in the nature of argument. It has to do with reasonable
expectations which are the focal point of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Finally, the individual defendants ask for dismissal of the claims as against them. It was
established at oral argument that the corporate defendant is a subchapter S, closely held,
corporation and that virtually all of the refund monies have been distributed to the small group of
shareholders who are the remaining defendants. Given these facts, the Court declines to dismiss
the claim against the individual defendants.
Govern yourselves accordingly.

The accountant apparently treated it as "retained earnings". What can be made of that, if anything,
remains to be seen.

1714

MEMORANDUM DECISION, Case number 940600003, Page 9Dated this CZLJ day of March, 2000.

K. L. McIFF
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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STOEL RIVES LLP
John A. Anderson (4464)
Matthew M. Durham (6214)
201 Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3131
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SDCTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
NYLE W. WILLIS

vs.

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS
CO., MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL
DENOYER; DONALD SAUNDERS;
JOHN DOES 1 through 5; and JANE
DOES 1 through 5,

Civil No. 940600003
Hon. K. L. Mclff

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF KANE

)
) ss.
)
Nyle W. Willis, having been first sworn, deposes and states:

1.

I am a resident of Kane County, Utah, over the age of majority, and

otherwise competent to make this affidavit.
2.

I am a certified public accountant duly licensed to practice in the State

SLCl-48002.1 337144001
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under the heading "Grand Canyon" set forth the balance sheet as it appeared on the Concession
Report for Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. for 1991. The next two columns under the heading
u

White Water" set forth the balance sheet as it appeared on the Concession Report for White

Water for the period of October 1, 1991 to December 31, 1991. The third two columns under
the heading "Combined Balance Sheet" set forth the totals of each of the line items as they
would have appeared had thefinancialreports been presented for the combined companies. It
was necessary to eliminate the $1,200,000 representing "Investment in White Water" (Exhibit
"F" at line 17) from the asset side of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.'s balance sheet and the
$1,200,000 representing "Partner's or Proprietor's Capital" (Exhibit "G" at line 33) from the
equity in the White Water balance sheet because the assets, liabilities and earnings are already
included when the two balance sheets are combined. Including the $1,200,000 overstates the
equity by that amount. The correct equity for Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. combined with
White Water as of December 31, 1991 is the total of capital stock of $74,720, additional paidin capital of $299,382 and retained earnings of $399,342 for a total of $773,444, which
represents the net book value of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. as of December 31, 1991.
This net book value is reflected in both Exhibit "H" (titled "TOTAL CAPITAL") and Exhibit
"I" (lines 22-24).
16.

Attached as Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of the balance sheet portion of

the corporate income tax return filed for Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. for the year ended
1991. The total net book value is consistent with the above, that is $773,445 (see lines 22-24).
17.

At no time has any officer, director, or shareholder of Grand Canyon

engaged in acts or omissions to manipulate thefinancialstatus of Grand Canyon, nor have they
SLCl-48002 I 33714-0001
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made any attempt to reduce Marc Smith's proportionate share of the company or reduce the
purchase price of his stock at the time Grand Canyon Expedition Co. purchased it.
18.

Grand Canyon Expedition Co.'s 1991 year-end financial statements and

accounting records were prepared several months before Marc Smith's separation from
employment.
19.

At the time I prepared the 1991 year-end financial statements and

accounting records for Grand Canyon Expedition Co., I was unaware of any possibility that
Marc Smith would leave the company's employ, or that Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. would
purchase Marc Smith's stock in Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.
20.

I was not contacted by anyone concerning Marc Smith's separation

from employment at Grand Canyon until July 1992, shortly before the separation occurred; at
that time, I was contacted by Dick Skeen, Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.'s attorney who
requested that I calculate the net book value as described in the Buy-Sell Agreement.
21.

Prior to that time, I never discussed Marc Smith's separation from

employment at Grand Canyon Expedition Co. with anyone.
DATED this

day of March, 1999.

Nyle W. Willis

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of March,

1999.

Notary Public
SLCl-48002.1 33714-0001
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * *

DEPOSITION OF

MARC SMITH,

NYLE WILLIAM WILLIS

Plaintiff,
vs.
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.,
MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL
DENOYER, RONALD R. SMITH;
DONALD SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES 1
through 5 and JANE DOES 1
through 5,

Civil No. 940600003

Defendants.

BE IT REMEMBERED, that on Tuesday, the 10th day of
October, 1995, the deposition of NYLE WILLIAM WILLIS,
produced as a witness at the instance of the plaintiff
pursuant to written notice and subpoena in the abovecaptioned matter now pending in the above-entitled Court,
was taken before me, Byron Ray Christiansen, a Notary Public
and Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of
Utah, commencing at the hour of 9:00 a.m. of said day, at
the Kane County Courthouse, 76 South Main, Kanab, Utah
84741.

BYRON

RAY

CHRISTIANSEN.

JR.

C E R T I F I E D SHORTHAND RCPOHTKR

(801)673-5100

1

we'll go from there.
Did you know, Mr. Willis, at the time the Sobek company
was acquired, that there was just one year left before the
contract —

the Sobek contract expired?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

And you testified earlier that your

understanding was usually those contracts —

concession

contract rights and the right of preference with them that
made them valuable were amortized over their life —

over

the remaining life of the contract before it was to expire
and had to be renewed, is that correct?
A.

That they were amortized over that length of time?

Q.

Usually they were amortized that way?

A.

Like I say, this is a unique company with a unique

situation.

I don't know if they —

what they are normally

done; this is the only client I have that has one of these
things.
Q.

All right.

then, is —

Well, I guess what I'm coming back to,

you say —

you know, I got completely lost when

I forgot your answer to "I assume so," and I lost my train
of thought.
But I was asking you, was I not, how it was determined
to amortize the Sobek $500,000 Contract Right of Preference
over —

you know, what the amortization period would be.

And you said you assumed it was five years, is that correct?
1558
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2
3

A.

Yes.

Q.

Maybe that's what I was asking you.

What did you

base that assumption on?

4

A.

Tax law.

5

Q.

Okay.

And it was —

was it you that set that up

6

that way or was it pursuant to instructions from Mr.

7

Saunders or his accountants in Washington?

B
9

A.

No, we didn't have any contact with the

accountants in Washington.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A*

So I set it up that way, I assume.

12

Q*

Hypothetically# if the million dollars, that

!3

represented the covenant not to compete when Saunders bought

14

the company from Ron Smith, was set up as a Contract Right

15

of Preference or a concession contract, in your mind, it

16

would have been amortized off over the remaining life of the

17

contract until it expired with the National Park Service?

18
19
2

°

MR. ANDERSON:

Objection.

Incomplete

hypothetical, calls for speculation.
Q.

(By Mr. Paxton)

Would that have been —

but for

21

the covenant not to compete, had the million dollars, that

2

2

was assigned to the covenant not to compete in the Ron Smith

23

and Don Saunders deal, been allocated to the contract right,

24

the concession contract and its right of preference, over

25

what period of time would you have amortized that on the
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . J R .
CEKTirtcD SHORTHAND REPORTER
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1
2

ballpark it, or what?
A.

No.

I think it had to do with the fair market

3

value that we had established on some of those assets in the

4

dissolution of Ronald R. Smith Company.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

I don't remember.

7

Q.

Okay.

Any other ways?

Is it fair to say, then, Mr. Willis, that

B

Exhibit No. 35, the Financial Statements you've prepared for

9

the company throughout these years —

these year-end

10

statements were kept for tax purposes rather than according

11

to GAP as such?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Are the assets being depreciated according to GAP

14

in all cases, as reflected in 35, the method of

15

depreciation?

16

A.

GAP will accept IRS depreciation in most cases,

17

but the decisions on how to depreciate the assets was made

1B

with the tax law in mind, not with GAP in mind.

19

20

Q.

And would that be the same answer for the way the

amortization —

the intangibles has been handled?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Let me show you what we've marked as Deposition

23

Exhibit No. 36, which is comprised of six pages, and ask you

2

*

if you ever recall seeing that document before.

2

5

represent —

Let me just

state on the record, that these were documents
BYRON

RAY

CHRISTIANSEN.

C E R T I F I E D SHORTHAND REPORT
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AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT by and between MARC SMITH ("Smithhereafter) and GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO. , a Otah corporation
("Corporation11 hereafter), is made in consideration of the mutual
promises and covenants of the parties as follows:
1.
Smith is a shareholder of the Corporation, owning
Certificate No. 4 representing 4,250 shares and Certificate No, 9
representing 2, 348 shares, a total of 6,598 shares ("Shares"
hereafter).
2.
The ownership and disposition of the Shares are
subject to the terms and conditions of a Buy-Sell Agreement dated
November 29, 198 6 by and among all of the shareholders of the
Corporation ("Buy-Sell Agreement* hereafter, a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit "A").
3.
Smith is an employee of the Corporation, having
executed an Employment Agreement dated November 29th, 1986; is
Vice President of the Corporation and is a member of the Board of
Directors.
4.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Buy-Sell
Agreement Smith hereby sells, assigns and transfers all of his
right, title and interest in and to the Shares owned by him for a
total purchase price of One Hundred Eighty Thousand Six Hundred
Thirty-Nine Dollars and Thirty-Seven Cents ($180,639.37). The
purchase price has been determined in accordance with the terms
of the Buy-Sell Agreement based upon One Hundred Forty percent
(140%) of the Corporation's net book value as of June 30, 1992.
5.

The purchase price shall be paid as follows:

a.
$69,6 90. 00 shall be paid by the Corporation
at Closing by check payable to Donald A. Saunders and Marc Smith
representing the amounts due from Marc Smith to Donald A.
Saunders as provided in the following-described Notes:
i.
Note dated November 19, 1986 in the
amount of $42,500. 00.
ii. Note dated September 30, 1991 in the
amount of $23,484.00.
iii. Interest on the above-described notes
from January 1, 1991 to July 25, 1992 in the amount of
$3,710.00.
Z DEPOSITION
I
EXHIBIT
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Upon receipt of the above check, Smith shall endorse it to Donald
A. Saunders which shall constitute payment in full of all amounts
owed by Smith to Donald A. Saunders in connection with the above
notes, and said notes shall be canceled.
b.
The balance of the purchase price in the
amount of $110,949,37 shall be evidenced by a Promissory Note in
the form attached to this Agreement as Exhibit "A* which shall be
executed by the Corporation, The promissory note shall provide
for payment in equal monthly installments payable over a period
of six years at ten percent (10%) interest per annum. The first
monthly installment shall be due on August 25th, 1992 and such
monthly installments shall be payable on the 25th day of each
month thereafter until principal and interest has been paid in
full. All payments shall first be credited to interest and the
balance to principal. Any time after the first monthly
installment, the holder of the note may demand payment in full.
Corporation shall make payment of the then unpaid balance within
15 days after receipt of a written demand for payment in full.
Corporation shall not have the right to prepay any monthly
payment.
6.
In addition to the payments provided above, and in
lieu of any other amounts or benefits which may be due from the
Corporation as provided in the Employment Agreement or otherwise,
including but not limited to bonus, additional salary,
commissions and health benefits, the Corporation shall pay Smith
the sum of Thirty-Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Forty Dollars and
Eighty-Eight Cents ($37,940.88) which represents severance pay.
The severence pay is subject to withholding taxes.
7.
Smith shall resign as an officer and employee of
the Corporation effective July 15, 1992 and shall execute a
resignation letter in the form attached as Exhibit "C".
8.
The closing for the transaction described in this
Agreement shall be July 25, 1992 at the offices of the
Corporation in Kanab, Utah- At the Closing the parties shall
deliver and perform the following:
a.

Corporation.

i.
Deliver a check payable to Marc Smith
and Donald A. Saunders in the amount of $69, 690. 00.
ii. Deliver a check to Marc Smith for
severance pay less taxes required to be withheld as
described in paragraph 6. The amount of the check
-2i:\wpt\095\0000igvj.W51
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shall be determined by deducting the applicable tax
withholdings from the gross severance pay of
$37, 940. 88.
iii. Deliver a Promissory Note in the form
of Exhibit "B" in the face amount of $110, 949, 37 in
. favor of Marc Smith and executed by the Corporation*
b.

Smith,

i.
Smith shall endorse the check payable to
Marc Smith and Donald A. Saunders in the amount of
$69, 690. 00 to Donald A. Saunders and deliver it to the
Corporation at Closing.
ii. Deliver Certificate No. 4 for 4,250
shares of Corporation stock and Certificate No. 9 for
2, 348 shares of Corporation stock to the Corporation.
The certificates shall be endorsed on the back by Marc
Smith.
c.
The Corporation shall deliver the check in
the amount of $6 9,6 90.00 to Donald A. Saunders in exchange for
the Promissory Notes executed by Marc Smith, on November 29, 1986
in the amount of $42,500.00, and on September 30, 1991 in the
amount of $23,484.00. Said Notes shall be marked upaid in full"
by Donald A. Saunders and returned to Marc Smith.
9.
The Corporation hereby waives any right to enforce
the provisions of the covenant not to compete set out in
paragraph II. 2 " Non-Competition" of the Employment Agreement
executed by Smith on November 29, 1986 in favor of the
Corporation; provided, however, that Marc Smith shall not
disclose confidential information regarding the business of the
Corporation acquired during his employment including but not
limited to trade secrets belonging to Corporation or solicit
customers of the Corporation or use or in any way disclose to
others mailing lists or lists of past or present customers of the
Corporation.
10. Smith represents and warrants that there are no
liens or other encumbrance against any of the Corporation stock
certificates owned by him except for the lien in favor of Donald
A. Saunders and that no other person or entity can claim or has
any interest in and to those certificates and that Smith has the
right to transfer the Shares as contemplated by this Agreement.

-3f:\wpt\09S\0OOOlgvg.W51
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11. This Agreement embodies the entire agreement
between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter
hereof and there are no agreements, warranties or representations
between the parties other than those set forth and as provided
herein.
12. This Agreement and each provision thereof shall be
binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Corporation and
Smith and their respective successors, heirs, personal
representatives or assigns.
13. This agreement shall be construed in accordance
with the laws of the State of Utah.
DATED this 25th day of July, 1992.
CORPORATION:
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS COMPANY

Michael Denoyer, President
SMITH:

B^
Mai-c Smith
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BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4138)
RICHARD J. ARMSTRONG (Bar No. 7461)
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
DERK G. RASMUSSEN

v.

:

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS
CO., MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL
DENOYER, RONALD R. SMITH,
DONALD SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES
1 through 5 and JANE DOES 1
through 5,

:
Civil No. 940600003
Judge Kay McKiff

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Derk G. Rasmussen, beingfirstduly sworn, hereby deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am a resident of Davis County, Utah, over the age of majority, and am otherwise

competent to make this affidavit.
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2.

I am a Certified Public Accountant by the American Institute of Certified Public

Accountants; a Certified Fraud Examiner by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners; and I am
Accredited in Business Valuations by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. I have
been practicing in the profession of accounting for the past 16 years.
3.

I have received severalfinancialrecords of Grand Canyon produced by it pursuant to

Plaintiffs discovery requests in preparation of this AflSdavit. I note that thefinancialstatement for
October 1991 a month critical to the analysis of the Whitewater/Sobek transaction was not produced.
4.

In his March

, 1999 affidavit, Nyle Willis states in paragraph 5, what the records

of Grand Canyon Expedition Company, "Grand Canyon", reflect the net book value to be for the
years of 1986 through 1992. Based on my review of thefinancialstatements, tax returns and Annual
Concessioners Reports prepared by Mr. Willis on behalf of Grand Canyon, and as set forth more
precisely herein below, the net book value entered for Grand Canyon for the years of 1986 through
1992 is substantially less than the net book value should have been according to generally accepted
accounting principles and their reasonable application, especially in light of the provision in the
subject Buy-Sell Agreementfixingoutgoing shareholders' stock forced sales price to Grand Canyon's
"net book value".
5.

In paragraphs 6 through IS of his affidavit, Mr. Willis explains how he eliminated

$ 1,200,000 representing "partners or proprietors capital"fromthe combinedfinancialstatements of
Whitewater/Sobek and Grand Canyon. While I do not have any dispute in theory with Mr. Willis'
elimination ofthe $ 1,200,000 "partners or proprietors capital"fromthe combinedfinancialstatement,
as set forth more fully in paragraph 6|.b. below, Mr. Willis, Grand Canyon, and its officers and
C:\MyFUes\SMITH\rasmussen.aJQf.wpd

2

1011

directors, recorded a value ofthe assets acquired through the Whitewater/Sobek acquisition $229,304
less than the $1,200,000 purchase price. This was accomplished by Grand Canyon and Mr. Willis
adjusting the $1.2 million dollar purchase price by deducting a negative retained earnings in the
amount of $229,304. This accounting treatment of Whitewater and Grand Canyon's books upon the
consolidation of thefinancialstatements is best reflected in Mr. Willis' reconciliation prepared and
attached as Exhibit "D" to Grand Canyon's Memorandum in Support of its Supplemental Motion for
Summary Judgment, and effectively decreases the net book value of Grand Canyon as of January 1,
1992 by $229,304.
6.

In Mr. Willis* paragraph 16, he states that the net book value of the combined Grand

Canyon/Whitewater/Sobek enterprise as of December 31,1991 was $773,445. It appears to me that
the net book value for the end of that year should at least be adjusted by $229,304 as set forth in
paragraph 5 above, and in addition, bears a substantial adjustment in accordance with the other
accounting applications set forth below in paragraph 7.
7.

In his affidavit paragraph 17, Mr. Willis states that iCNo officer, director, or

shareholder of Grand Canyon engaged in acts or omissions to manipulate thefinancialstatus of Grand
Canyon, nor have they made any attempt to reduce Marc Smith's proportioned share of the company
or reduced the purchase price of the stock at the time Grand Canyon Expedition Company purchased
it." See Willis Affidavit, ^f 17. Upon review of Grand Canyon'sfinancialrecords, in my opinion, Mr.
Willis' statement is false in the following particulars:
a.

When Grand Canyon acquired theriverrunning business assets from Ron

Smith in 1986, Mr. Willis, ostensibly under the direction of the officers and directors of Grand
C:\MyFUcs\SMrra\rasmusscn.afif.\vpd

3

1010

Canyon, accounted for the assets acquired and included them on the books of Grand Canyon.
In my opinion, Mr. Willis and the officers and directors of Grand Canyon did not comply with
generally accepted accounting principles and unreasonably accounted for the purchased assets
on thefinancialstatements of Grand Canyon.
Grand Canyon paid Ron Smith $2,147,000 for the assets. Approximately $ 1,047,000
of the purchase price was allocated to physical assets such as equipment, land and buildings.
$100,000 of the purchase price was allocated to good will and $1,000,000 of the purchase
price was allocated to a covenant not to compete granted to Grand Canyon by Ron Smith.
A copy of the Grand Canyon/Ron Smith purchase agreement is attached to Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition as Exhibit "D" and made a part hereof. Generally accepted
accounting principles require that when a company acquires a business by purchasing assets,
the assets should be placed on the balance sheet of the acquiring company at fair value. In
other words, the purchase price of the business assets is included on the balance sheet of the
acquiring company by allocating the purchase price to identifiable acquired assets based on
each asset's fair value. Generally accepted accounting principles also require a prioritization
of how the assets are to be allocated. The purchase price is first allocated to all physical
assets acquired such as land, buildings, and equipment. If the purchase price exceeds the fair
value of the physical assets, the remaining amount is required by generally accepted
accounting principles to be allocated to intangible assets such as good will, permits and
covenants not to compete. The process of allocating purchase price to intangible assets is the
same as the allocation process for physical or tangible assets, that is, their fair value. To
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comply with generally acceptable accounting principles, each identifiable, intangible asset
needs to have its fair value determined so that an appropriate amount of the purchase price
can be allocated to that asset. In this case, Mr. Willis and the officers and directors of Grand
Canyon erred when they simply recorded $1,000,000 on the books of Grand Canyon
attributable to Ron Smith's covenant not to compete, withoutfirstmaking a determination
of the covenant's fair value. Generally accepted accounting principles require that a
transaction be recorded based on its substance, rather than its form. In my opinion, Ron
Smith's covenant not to compete was virtually worthless and therefore little, if any, of the
purchase price should have been allocated to it. My reasons follow:
(1) Ron Smith sold all of his permits to operate river trips on the Colorado River
through the Grand Canyon to Grand Canyon as part of the 1986 transaction. It was
illegal to run commercial river trips through the Grand Canyon without a permit. In
1986, new permits were not being issued by the federal government;
(2) Ron Smith was about 45 years old at the time of the sale when he signed the
covenant not to compete and expressed his intentions to all concerned that it was his
purpose to get out of the business and "gofishing"see Ron Smith's Deposition,
216:15-216:2, attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum as Exhibit "K" and made a part
hereof;
(3) Marc Smith, not Ron, had been running the business for several years before Ron
sold his assets to Grand Canyon. See Don Saunders Deposition 33:14 to 34:12,
attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum as Exhibit T ' and made a part hereof; and,
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(4) Ron Smith remained a 10 percent shareholder of Grand Canyon and agreed to
consult with Grand Canyon as necessary and was paid a salary for that purpose. See
November 29, 1986 Purchase Agreement % 2, 3 and 24, Exhibit D.
I found no analysis of the fair value of Ron Smith's covenant not to compete
performed by Mr. Willis or any officer or director of Grand Canyon. It is my opinion,
therefore, that neither Mr. Willis nor any officer or director of Grand Canyon followed
generally accepted accounting principles when they booked Ron Smith's covenant not to
compete at $1,000,000.
I recognize in 1986 Grand Canyon had a tax incentive to record as much of the
purchase price as possible to the covenant not to compete. At that time, the tax laws allowed
a company to write off a covenant not to compete over the life of the covenant. Indeed,
Grand Canyon wrote off Ron Smith's covenant not to compete within four years of its
acquisition, reflecting an annual write-off of $250,000, which came directly off the net book
value. While this might have been good tax planning, it was not in compliance with generally
accepted accounting principles.
At the same time Mr. Willis recorded a $1,000,000 value for Ron Smith's covenant
not to compete on the books of Grand Canyon, he completely ignores the most valuable asset
acquired by Grand Canyon in the Ron Smith asset acquisition. The U.S. Forest Service
permits to operate river trips through the Grand Canyon are the most valuable assets acquired
by Grand Canyon. Without those, Grand Canyon cannot operate in the Grand Canyon. In
Mr. Willis' 1986 accounting, no mention is made of the permits or their value on the books
and records of Grand Canyon. (In 1993 the tax laws were changed to require the
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amortization of all intangible assets, including covenants not to compete, over IS years. This
tax law change virtually eliminated the tax planning employed by Mr. Willis and the officers
and directors of Grand Canyon in 1986.) It is worth noting that when Grand Canyon
acquired the Whitewater/Sobek assets in 1991, most of the intangible value was recorded by
Mr. Willis and the officers and directors of Grand Canyon, as it should have been in 1986, to
the U.S. Forest Service permits. Indeed the permits are the only asset of Whitewater/Sobek
that had any value to Grand Canyon. A copy of a letterfromMike Denoyer to Don Saunders
discussing the Whitewater deal, which was produced by Defendants in discovery, is attached
to Plaintiffs Memorandum as Exhibit "F' and made a part hereof. In my opinion, in order
for itsfinancialstatements to comply with generally accepted accounting principles, Mr. Willis
and the officers and directors of Grand Canyon should have allocated the $1,000,000
attributed to Ron Smith's covenant not to compete, to the U.S. Forest Service permits, and
perhaps some small amount to the covenant not to compete and good will Had Mr. Willis
and the officers and directors of Grand Canyon recorded the value of the permits at their fanvalue, the net book of Grand Canyon would have been significantly different on July 31,1992
when Marc Smith's stock was redeemed.
As generally accepted accounting principles require the amortization of intangible
assets over their useful lives, the life of the permits and good will is certainly greater than four
years (the amortization period used to write off Ron Smith's covenant not to compete.) By
way of comparison, Grand Canyon amortized the $100,000 allocated to good will recorded
at its acquisition of Ron Smith's assets to the limited extent that as of July 31, 1992, none of
the $100,000 allocated toward good will had been amortized at all.
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It is my opinion that the amortization of Ron Smith's permits acquired by Grand
Canyon should have been the maximum allowable period under the generally accepted
accounting principles, or 40 years. The permits Grand Canyon acquired from Ron Smith are
now approximately 35 years old and still have a far-reaching useful life. For all intents and
purposes, it seems the permits will continue in perpetuity.
If Mr. Willis and the officers and directors of Grand Canyon had properly booked
$1,000,000 of the purchase price toward the forest service permits, and amortized that over
40 years instead of four years, the net book value of Grand Canyon would have been
approximately $862,500 higher in July of 1992 when Marc Smith's stock was redeemed.
b.

As set forth above in paragraph 4, Grand Canyon recorded a value of the

Whitewater/Sobek assets acquired in the 1991 sale on Grand Canyon's books in an amount
which is $229,321 less than the $1.2 million purchase price. A copy of Grand Canyon's
November 30 and December 31, 1991 financial statements are attached to Plaintiffs
Memorandum as Exhibit "G" and made a part hereof. As part of his consolidation of the
Whitewater/Sobekfinancialstatement with that of Grand Canyon, Mr. Willis did not enter
onto the books of Grand Canyon the full purchase price value of $1,200,000. Mr. Willis
reduced the equity value of the Whitewater/Sobek investment by creating a negative balance
in the retained earnings of Whitewater/Sobek Investment in the amount of $229,304. This
negative balance is comprised of four components: (1) Mr. Willis booked the assets at
$1,170,000 instead of $1,200,000 purchase price creating a difference of $30,000; (2) Mr.
Willis entered afigureof depreciation in the amount of $59,304 for assets that had been
acquired approximately one month earlier; (3) a negative cash balance of $26,382 was
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recorded; and, (4) Mr. Willis recorded prepaid, 1992 trip deposits in the amount of $113,618
without reflecting a corresponding increase in the cash account.
I find it remarkable that assets acquired one month prior to consolidation would
generate a cash loss of $140,450, non-cash depreciation of $59,304 and a reduction in asset
value for the purchase price of $30,000. Certainly, generally accepted accounting principles
would allow for the recording of some depreciation for the month of December 1991, but not
in the substantial amount of $59,304. This aggressive depreciation represents 12.6 percent
of the entire recorded value of the Whitewater/Sobek physical assets. This level of
depreciation is inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles, or may be at best
on the very high end of what is allowable by generally accepted accounting principles.
Similarly, Mr. Willis and the officers and directors of Grand Canyon booked a cash loss of
$140,450 for approximately one month generated by the assets of a non-operating entity,
when in comparison, Grand Canyon's year to date operating expenses for the month of
December 1991 increased by only $87,804 as compared with year to date operating expenses
through November 30,1991. See Exhibit G. Finally, Mr. Willis provides no explanation for
recording Whitewater/Sobek's assets on the books of Grand Canyon at $30,000 less than the
purchase price of $1,200,000.
c.

When Whitewater/Sobek assets were acquired by Grand Canyon in 1991, Mr.

Willis recorded intangible value of the U.S. Forest Service permits at $500,000, the customer
mailing list at $100,000 and the good will at $100,000. See Exhibit G. While this method
employed by Mr. Willis of accounting for the intangible assets is closer to being in compliance
with generally accepted accounting principles from that previously employed by Grand
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Canyon upon the acquisition of Ron Smith's assets, it still is not without its problems. First,
Mr. Willis makes no assessment for the fair value of the forest service permits. It appears that
the permits are the only reason Grand Canyon acquired Whitewater/Sobek's assets. See
Exhibit F. Second, Mr. Willis' allocation of $100,000 toward a mailing list and $100,000
toward good will appears to be entirely arbitrary. The allocations do not of themselves affect
the net book value of Grand Canyon as of July of 1992, but the amortization of these
intangible assets does. In the seven monthsfromJune 30, 1992 back to November of 1991
when Whitewater/Sobek's assets were acquired, Grand Canyon wrote off $90,000 of the
intangible value. A copy of Grand Canyon's June 30, 1992 balance sheet and financial
statement is attached to Plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibit "H" and made a part hereof.
In my opinion, $90,000 is far in excess of economic reality and is an unreasonable
application of generally accepted accounting principles.

The assets acquired from

Whitewater/Sobek in November of 1991 would not have reduced their economic value by
$90,000 in seven months. If anything, they would have increased in value. As a result, in my
opinion, to conform to generally accepted accounting principles, any amortization of the
intangiblesfromthe Whitewater/Sobek asset acquisition should be over 40 years. Had Mr.
Willis amortized the intangible assets over 40 years in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles, the appropriate amortization for the seven monthsfromNovember of
1991 to June of 1992 would have been $11,250 instead of $90,000.
d.

Based on thefinancialdocuments I have reviewed, it appears to have been Mr.

Willis' and/or Grand Canyon's officers' and directors' policy to expense items that could
properly have been capitalized under generally accepted accounting principles. For example,
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legal fees paid by Grand Canyon to defend and renew the forest service permits could have
been capitalized according to generally accepted accounting principles, which capitalization
would have increased the net book value dollar for dollar for all such fees incurred.
e.

In my opinion, Grand Canyon adopted an unreasonably conservative

accounting policy in recognizing pre-paid trip revenue. As of June 30, 1992, there was
$1,107,059.45 of prepaid trip fees for 1992 trips sitting in a current liability account on the
books of Grand Canyon. A copy of Grand Canyon's June 30, 1992financialstatement is
attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum as Exhibit "H" and made a part hereof. In my opinion,
at a minimum, the prepaid trip revenue should have been recognized to the extent of fixed
costs already incurred (taking into account historical cancellation rates) plus revenue equal
to the potential cancellation fees on the prepaid revenue. The reasonable recognition of these
substantial receipts as income would have substantially increased the net book value as of
June 30, 1992.
f.

According to generally accepted accounting principles, depreciation expense

should be recorded according to the matching principle. The cost of acquiring an asset should
be spread over the time period that the asset participates in the generation of revenue.
Typically this is done by estimating an asset's useful life and depreciating the asset over its
useful life. The depreciation taken by Grand Canyon through Mr. Willis and/or its officers
and directors appears to be unreasonably aggressive given the nature and longevity of the
assets owned by Grand Canyon, particularly in light of the company's obligations under its
buy-sell agreement with its shareholders to buy back its shareholders' stock at the net book
value. The aggressive manipulation of generally accepted accounting principles as applied by
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Mr. Willis in this case results in an unreasonably reduced net book value available to Marc
Smith in July of 1992.
8.

Upon review ofthe Grand Canyon April 1992 pre bookings as reflected on its financial

statements, as compared to its April 1991 pre bookings, it appears that Grand Canyon's bookings in
1992 were almost double those of 1991. A copy of Grand Canyon's April 30, 1991 and April 30,
1992financialstatements is attached hereto as Exhibit "L" and made a part hereof. Further, those
bookings were substantially higher than any preceding year. Apparently, Grand Canyon was sensitive
to this potential increase in revenue since it paid off in full its $542,000 long-term note payable to
Shareholder Don Saunders in June of 1992. A copy of the May 31, 1992 Grand Canyon financial
statement is attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum as Exhibit "M" and made a part of hereof. See also
Exhibit H. According to Grand Canyon's financial records, it was on the cusp of a wave of
substantial increase in its income at the time it terminated Marc Smith in July of 1992. A copy of
Grand Canyon's July 31, 1992financialstatements attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum as Exhibit
"N" and made a part hereof. I note that even though Grand Canyon paid Saunders in excess of
$500,000 cashfromits 1992-1993 trip deposits, essentially none of that income had been recognized
as income by Mr. Willis or the other officers and directors of Grand Canyon by July 1992.
9.

The proper method for accounting for a refund, such as that received by Grand

Canyonfromthe state of Arizona related to the entertainment tax, would be to record the receipt of
the refund as a "prior period adjustment". According to generally accepted accounting principles,
a "prior period adjustment" is an accounting treatment used when a transaction occurs or an error
is discovered which does not relate to the period in which it is determined or realized. Generally
accepted accounting principles require the accountant, in this case Mr. Willis, to record the amount
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in question directly to equity via a "prior period adjustment". The "prior period adjustment" is shown
in the equity section of the balance sheet and places the reader of thefinancialstatement on notice
that the afifect relates to prior periods. It is my opinion that generally accepted accounting principles
require the consideration of the portion of the Arizona entertainment tax refund that would have been
in existence in June of 1992 as part of the equity as of June 1992.
10.

Based on my review of thefinancialrecords of Grand Canyon, produced to date by

Defendants including those related to the 1996 Arizona entertainment tax refund, and according to
a reasonable application of generally accepted accounting principles, the net book value of Grand
Canyon in June of 1992 should increase by at least $1,750,554.
DATED this J /

day of March, 1999.

DERKG
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

3l

&iom4&*^

MUSSEN

day of March, 1999.

i^fan^lIUArrOg.

Notary Public

MOTAAY PUBLIC
« J £ A C I E WILLIAMS
Salt UkeCrty.UT 84111
My Commission Expires
April 16, 2002
_ STATE OF UTAH
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RECEIVED
MAR - 2 1999
STOEL RIVES LLP
John A. Anderson (#4464)
Matthew M. Durham (#6214)
One Utah Center, Suite 1100
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-4904
Telephone: (801)328-3131

STIRBA 4 HATHAWAY

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF
INTERROGATORIES

vs.

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.,
MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL
DENOYER; DONALD SAUNDERS;
JOHN DOES 1 through 5; and JANE
DOES 1 through 5,

Civil No. 940600003
The Honorable K.L. Mclff

Defendants.

Defendants Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., ("Grand Canyon") Martin Mathis, Michael
Denoyer, Donald Saunders (sometimes collectively referred to as "Defendants"), hereby
respond to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

SLC1-48148.1
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INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

Identify the person who informed you Grand

Canyon Expeditions Co. might be entitled to a refund of the Amusement Tax pursuant to the
Arizona Supreme Court's ruling in Wilderness World Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d
108 (Ariz. 1995).
ANSWER:

Defendants object to this interrogatory to the extent that it seeks

information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine.
Defendants further object to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is overly broad in that the
Wilderness World case was decided years after the separation of Plaintiff from employment at
Grand Canyon. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Defendants state that Grand
Canyon and Michael Denoyer were informed by counsel in Arizona of the Wilderness World
litigation.
INTERROGATORY NO, 5:

Identify the individual at Grand Canyon

Expeditions Co. who first received the information referred to in Interrogatory No. 4.
ANSWER:

Michael Denoyer.

INTERROGATORY NO, 6:

State the date(s) Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.

received a refund of the Amusement Tax pursuant to the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling in
Wilderness World Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1995).
ANSWER:

Defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is overly

broad and not reasonably calculated to the discovery of admissible evidence because Grand
Canyon was unaware of any refund from the State of Arizona until more than three years after
Plaintiffs separation from employment at Grand Canyon. Subject to and without waiving this

SLCi-48148.1
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objection, Grand Canyon received a refund of $907,916.94 in three payments in late 1995 or
early 1996.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

Identify to whom the refund of the Amusement

Tax was made payable.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to this interrogatory on the same grounds discussed in

their answer to Interrogatory No. 6. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Defendants
state that ail refund payments were made to Grand Canyon.
INTERROGATORY NO, 8:

State the period of time during which the

Amusement Tax was assessed Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. by the state of Arizona.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to this interrogatory on the same grounds discussed in

their answer to Interrogatory No. 6. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Defendants
state that the state of Arizona assessed the Amusement Tax against Grand Canyonfromthe
time the company was formed until April 1995.
INTERROGATORY NO, 9:

State how the Amusement Tax refunded Grand

Canyon Expeditions Co., Mike Denoyer, Martin Matties, Don Saunders, Ron Smith or any
other individual affiliated with Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. was applied and distributed
from the date of receipt through the present, and identify where the refund was accounted for
on Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.'s financial statements and tax returns.
ANSWER: Defendants object to this interrogatory on the same grounds as discussed
in their answer to Interrogatory No. 6. Subject to and without waiving this objection,
Defendants state that Grand Canyon received a total $907,916.94 in three payments from the
state of Arizona. Of that amount, $280,600.18 was paid to Grand Canyon with the intention
SLCl-48148.1 33714-0001
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that Grand Canyon refund that amount to certain of its former customers. All but
approximately $44,000 of that amount has been refunded to former Grand Canyon customers.
The remaining amount refunded to Grand Canyon was treated as corporate income during the
quarter it was received.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10.

Identify all persons who received distribution of

any portion of the refunded Amusement Tax and the amount received by each such person.
ANSWER:

Defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is overly

broad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. Many of the individuals who received refunds were former clients or
customers of Grand Canyon whose specific identity is not relevant to Plaintiffs claims in this
actions. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Defendants state that $699,316.76 of
the amount refunded was received by Grand Canyon.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11:

State the date(s) Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.

distributed all or a portion of the refunded Amusement Tax to Mike Denoyer, Martin Mathis,
Don Saunders, Ron Smith, customers of Grand Canyon Expedition Co., and all other affiliates
of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.
ANSWER: Defendants object to this interrogatory on the same grounds discussed in
their answer to Interrogatory No. 6. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Defendants
state that certain refund payments were made to former customers of Grand Canyon as
described in answer to Interrogatory No. 9. Other than those payments, refunds of the
Amusement Tax were not made, as such, to any individual or entity. Rather, those remaining
amounts were treated as corporate income for the period in which they were received.
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Decisions regarding corporate distributions were made based upon a number of factors, only
one of which was the Amusement Tax refund payment.
DATED this

Ulr~

day of March, 1999.
STOEL RIVES LLP

^Richard Sf. Skeen
John A. Anderson
Matthew M. Durham
Attorneys for Defendants
VERIFICATION
Michael R. Denoyer, as President of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., states he
has read the foregoing Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories to
Defendants; that the facts contained in the answers were compiled by various employees and
agents of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., and no single employee or agent of Grand Canyon
Expeditions Co. has personal knowledge as to all the facts contained in the answers; that the
answers are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, and that he
signs the Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories for and on behalf of
Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.

Michael R. Denoyer
President
Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.
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RECEIVED
JAN 2 1 1999 '
Stirba and Hathaway

DISTRICT COURT, KANE COUNTY, UTAH
76 North Main
Kanab, UT 84741
Telephone: 435-644-2458 Fax: 435-644-2052

MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

Case No. 940600003

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.,
MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL DENOYER,
DONALD SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES 1
through 5 and JANE DOES 1 through 5,

Assigned Judge: K. L. Mclff

Defendants,

Undisputed Pacts
The defendant, Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., (hereafter the "Company") is a Utah
corporation organized in November 1986. Its initial assets were acquired from a similarly named
entity, Grand Canyon Expeditions Inc. The owners of the new Company were five in number:
The plaintiff Marc Smith, his brother Ronald Smith, founder and owner of the selling company,
and the three who are now named as individual defendants, Martin Mathis, Michael Denoyer,
and Donald Saunders.
Defendant Saunders provided the funds to purchase the assets and form the new
Company, but retained only 28% of the stock. Ten percent was issued to Ron Smith as part of
the consideration in the buy-out of the former company. Twenty-eight percent went to Denoyer

815

Memorandum Decision, Case number 940600003, Page 2 and 17% each to Mathis and plaintiff. The latter three were required to sign non-recourse notes
in favor of Saunders for the stock issued to each of them.
While Denoyer, Mathis and plaintiff did not contribute cash, they apparently brought
experience and expertise and became the principal operators of the Company. Each was required
to sign an employment contract. The defendant Denoyer became president, responsible for daily
operations; the defendant Mathis became vice-president of marketing, and the plaintiff became
vice-president of operations. The employment agreement of each covered the year 1987 but
carried the following proviso: "At the request of Expeditions [the Company], this Agreement and
the Employment Period may be extended by the mutual consent of Employee and Expeditions."
The employment agreements went on to provide: "Either Employee or Expeditions may
terminate Employee's employment at any time, with or without cause."
At the same time the employment agreements were executed, the Company entered into a
buy-sell agreement with each of its five shareholders. Under its terms, the Company was obliged
to buy and each respective shareholder was obliged to sell his stock "Upon . . . death, disability
or termination of employment with the corporation, (either voluntarily or involuntarily). . .."
The one-year employment agreements were not formally renewed, but Denoyer as
president and Mathis and plaintiff as vice-presidents continued as the principal operating officers
of the company until July 15,1982. On that date, and for reasons that are in dispute, Denoyer
advised plaintiff that he was being terminated and that the necessary documentation was being
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Saunders, who had funded the creation of The Company and to whom plaintiff still owed money
for issuance of stock to him. When plaintiff reached Saunders two or three days later, Saunders
stood behind the termination decision and discussed with plaintiff the buy-out provisions.
Thereafter, plaintiff obtained the termination documents which he had in his possession for a
matter of days before executing them on July 25, 1992. There were two documents, one a single
page entitled "Resignation" and a second one labeled "Agreement". The latter made reference to
the former and then went on to provide in some detail the terms of the buy-out of plaintiffs stock
as well as other provisions concerning his relationship with the Company.
Upon execution of the documents, The Company made payment to plaintiff according to
the terms thereof and continued to do so during the months and years that followed until full
satisfaction.
On January 10,1994, some one and one-half years after termination, plaintiff brought the
within action. It initially named the current defendants along with plaintiffs brother, Ron Smith,
and his brother's children. It alleged breach of contract, tortuous interference with contract and
economic relations, wrongful termination, libel and slander, estoppel and claims for punitive as
well as other damages. In July 1998, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint narrowing the
relief sought and limiting the defendants to four: The Company, the original financier and major
owner, Saunders, and the two remaining officers, Denoyer and Mathis.
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agreement and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Legal Discussion
In their motion for summary judgment, defendant's raise four arguments. Each will be
discussed in turn.
I.
Defendants initially claim that plaintiff is an "at will" employee by virtue of the express
language of the employment agreement which covered the year 1987, but which defendants'
claim was extended by implication as evidenced by the fact that the employment has continued
uninterrupted. They point to the language that provided for extension at the request of the
company and the consent of both. Plaintiff counters with the argument that the one-year contract
has expired by its own terms and therefore has no bearing on the issues. The Court cannot
embrace either position as a matter of law. The trier of fact may conclude from the evidence and
permissible inferences that the terms of the written contract were perpetuated with the consent of
both parties. If such be the case, the employment would be an "at will" arrangement. On the
other hand, a full airing of the evidence may establish that the relationship evolved into
something which contemplated greater job security and permanency.
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Defendants next argue that even if the written employment agreement was not extended
and accordingly no longer governs, Utah law raises a presumption of an "at will" employment
arrangement. Defendants are correct, but this presumption has been softened considerably during
recent years. The presumption can be overcome by an affirmative showing by the plaintiff that
the parties expressly or impliedly intended a longer term or that the relationship could be
terminated only for cause. Berube v. Fashions Center, Ltd., Ill P2.d 1033 (Utah 1989).
Moreover, as stated in Berube, "[T]he determination of whether sufficient indicia of an implied
in-fact promise exists is a question of fact for the jury, with the burden of proof resting upon the
plaintiff-employee." Id, at 1044. The facts in this case have not been developed sufficiently for
the Court to conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff could not meet this burden.
III.
Defendants next argue that even if the relationship had evolved into something other than
"at will" employment, the Company had just reason to terminate plaintiff for cause. On this
point, the evidence is clearly in dispute. Defendants point to numerous confrontations and
incidents in which plaintiffs behavior or practices were considered contrary to the interests of
the Company. Plaintiff counters with denials and affidavits of other Company employees that
paint a complimentary portrait of plaintiff. The Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law
that reasonable minds would arrive at the same conclusion with respect to this issue.
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Finally, defendants advance the position that the parties reached an accord between July
15 and July 25, 1992 as reflected in the termination documents. With this the Court is essentially
in agreement. Plaintiffs resignation is short and simple and is signed and notarized. The
accompanying agreement provides for the purchase of plaintiff s stock at 140% of value,
consistent with the buy-sell agreement, and affords him two other forms of relief to which he
does not appear to have been previously entitled. These two benefits are respectively a severance
payment equivalent to one year's salary and the second, a relaxation of a non-competition
covenant.
Under paragraph 6 of the termination agreement, the severance pay was "In addition to
the payments provided above [for stock purchase], and in lieu of any other amounts or benefits
which may be due from the corporation as provided in the employment agreement or
otherwise . . . . " This is strong language. Plaintiffs deposition testimony indicates that it was he
who raised the possibility of a severance payment with Mr. Saunders. According to plaintiffs
testimony, Saunders replied, "We could think about it. Give you a year. I'm sure the guys would
go with that." Plaintiffs deposition volume II at 297. That, of course, is what happened.
Plaintiff alleges by deposition or affidavit testimony that he was in "shock", that he was
"coerced" and that he "did not know what he was doing", but he stops short of claiming fraud in
the inducement or some other legal theory warranting avoidance of the terms agreed upon in
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compromised in light of his testimony regarding the matter of severance pay.
Plaintiffs deposition testimony also establishes his awareness of the existence of a noncompete obligation binding upon him at the time of termination. Id. at 125. Under paragraph 9
of the termination agreement, the Company agreed to waive any right to enforce this provision.
This is further consideration for plaintiffs compromise of a continued right of employment if
such existed at that time.
By way of affidavit, plaintiff seeks to water-down his deposition testimony regarding his
role in arriving at the termination agreement, but he fails to supply a sufficient explanation for
the discrepancies and further fails to supply sufficient facts to support a claim for relief from the
documents signed by him and which governed the termination and buy-out. To the contrary, the
undisputed evidence is that Plaintiff accepted the agreed-upon payments contemporaneously
made as well as the payments that were made during the months and years that followed.
Ruling
For the reasons set forth, the Court is persuaded that plaintiffs claim of an entitlement to
continued employment fails as a matter of law. This is true whether premised on a claimed
breach of an implied in-fact employment agreement or a claimed breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing. There is, however, one other issue which has been raised in a somewhat oblique
fashion, but has not been resolved to the Court's satisfaction. Plaintiff has alleged that at the
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been in the two preceding years and only half of what it was reported to be in the following year.
He further points to a subsequent recovery by the company of a very substantial improperly paid
tax to the State of Arizona. Defendants' counsel undertook at oral argument to make explanation
for the variations in stock values as well as the subsequently recovered tax payment. Perhaps
there are adequate explanations, but at this point it appears that the buy-out of plaintiff s
ownership interest occurred at the worst possible time for him. Moreover, it appears from the
deposition testimony to which the Court has had exposure, that plaintiff was not versed in the
Company's accounting matters and would not have been in a position to evaluate the numbers
unilaterally supplied. Further, all parties would have been laboring under the erroneous
assumption that the tax payments were gone forever.
The duty of good faith and fair dealing applies not only to the original agreements
between these parties, but would have extended to the termination proceedings and the manner of
accounting and fixing values. And this is so even though the buy-sell agreement accorded
"conclusive status" to the values determined by the accountant. The conclusive status of these
values necessarily presumes the absence of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Conclusion
Defendants' counsel is directed to prepare a partial summary judgment in conformity with
this memorandum decision and the rules of the Court. Counsel for both parties are invited to
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proceedings or trial.
Dated this ( J

day of January, 1999.
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT dated the

Zl

day of

/t

4e^r

1986, is entered into by and between Marc Smith, (hereinafter
referred to as "Employee") and Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.,
(hereinafter referred to as "Expeditions").

I.
A.

RECITALS

Expeditions is engaged in the business of promoting

and running raft trips in the Grand Canyon, Arizona.
B.

It is essential for the full protection of the

business of Expeditions (hereinafter referred to as the
"Employer"), and its employees engaged in such businesses, that
the employees should not disclose confidential or other vital
information regarding such business with which they have or may
become acquainted during the period of their employment.

Without

such protection, it would not be practical to expose Employee to
work being done by Employer and its employees, nor to bring
Employee into free and open relationships with other employees of
Employer who are possessed of such proprietary information.

II.

AGREEMENT

Therefore, it is agreed as follows:
1.

Terms of Employment.

Terms of Employment of

2 DEPOSITION
i
EXHIBIT
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I Afore Sfrr^

Employee by Expeditions, including Employment Period, are as
follows:
A.

Employment Period,

Expeditions agrees to

employ Employee, and Employee agrees to remain in the
employ of Expeditions during the period (the "Employment
Period") beginning on the 1st day of January, 1987, and
ending on he 31st day of December, 1987.

During the

Employment Period, the Employee shall perform such
duties for Expeditions as he may be reasonably requested
to do, relating to its business.

At the request of

Expeditions this Agreement and the Employment Period may
be extended by the mutual consent of Employee and
Expeditions.
B.

Performance of Duties.

Expeditions and

Employee agree that during the Employment Period,
Employee shall devote his business time to the business
affairs of Expeditions and its affiliated companies.
Employee's responsibilities to Expeditions and its
affiliated companies shall be substantially comparable
to the duties he performed for other companies immediately prior to the date hereof or as mutually agreed.
C.

Compensation.

Subject to the terms and condi-

tions of this Employment Agreement, Employee shall be
compensated as follows:

-2-

1.

For the 12 consecutive-month period

commencing on the first day January 1987,
Employee shall receive, in substantially equal
monthly or more frequent installments, a basic
c

annual salary of $ J^ ccc

j^.

^^

basic

salary payable during any extension of the
Employment Period shall be by mutual agreement
of the parties.
2.

Employee shall be entitled to parti-

cipate in a bonus plan to be established and
to be known as The Grand Canyon Expeditions
Co. Key Personnel Bonus Plan.
be

Said Plan will

based on a percentage of pre federal in-

come tax net profit and substantially in the
form attached hereto as Attachment A.
3.

Either Employee or Expeditions may

terminate Employee's employment at any time,
with or without cause.

Expedition's obliga-

tion to pay Employee in accordance with the
provisions of subparagraph 1 next above shall
cease as of the date of Employee's termination
of employment with Expeditions, if such termination is on account of Employee's death, disability, voluntary resignation or on account

-3-

)f his dismissal for cause.

If Employee's

employment with Expeditions terminates for any
other reason, Expedition's obligation to pay
Employee in accordance with subparagraph 1
next above shall continue for the remainder of
the Employment Period, or, if earlier, until
the date of his death, as though he were
employed during that period.
4.

If Employee's employment is termi-

nated on account of Employee's death, disability, or dismissal by Expeditions without
cause, then Employee shall be entitled to
receive, prorated for the applicable one year
period based upon the period of employment
preceding such termination, benefits under
Attachment A.
5.

Employee shall be entitled to the

same pension, retirement, medical, insurance,
customary holidays, and other fringe benefits
as shall be made available to management employees of Expeditions.
2.

Non-Competition.

During the Employment Period and

during the two years after the end of the Employment Period, or
any extensions thereof, Employee shall not:
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a.

Own (directly or indirectly), work for or

act as a consultant for, or serve as a director, officer
or principal of, any business (except for the Employer
or an affiliated company) which engages (as a major line
of business) in, or
b.

Intentionally assist any business (except

for the Employer or an affiliated company) in the establishment or operation of, the business of promoting and
running rafting trips in the Grand Canyon, Arizona,
3.

Successors.

In the event that Expeditions shall a

any time be merged or consolidated with or into any other corporation or corporations or shall sell or otherwise transfer substantially all of its assets to another corporation, the provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit of the consolidated Corporation

or to the Corporation

which such assets shall be sold or transferred.
4.

Assigns.

Except as provided in the preceding para

graph, this Agreement may not be assigned by either Expeditions
or Employee.
5*

Notices.

Any notice or communication required by

or permitted to be given in connection with this Agreement shall
be in writing and shall be delivered in person, sent by prepaid
telegram and followed with a confirming letter, or mailed by

-5-
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certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to Employee at such address as he may rom time to time
select and to Expeditions at:
Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.
P. 0. Box 0
Kanab, Utah 84741
6.

General Provisions.

The following general terms

and provisions shall apply:
A.

No amendment or modification of this Agreement

shall be deemed effective unless executed in writing by both
parties hereto.
B.

No term or condition of this Agreement shall be

deemed to have been waived, nor shall there be any estoppel to
enforce any provision of this Agreement, except by written
instrument executed by the party charged with such waiver or
estoppel.

Any written waiver shall not be deemed a continuing

waiver unless specifically stated, shall operate only as to the
specific term or condition waived and shall not constitute a
waiver of such term or condition for the future or as to any act
other than that specifically waived.
C.

If any part, term or provision of this Agreement is

held by the courts to be unenforceable, illegal or in conflict
with any federal, state or local laws, such part, term or provision shall be considered severable from the rest of the Agree-
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ment.

The remaining portions of the Agreement shall not be af-

fected, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be
construed and inferred as if the Agreement did not contain the
particular term, part or provision held to be invalid, unless the
invalid provisions, when considered in the aggregate, render the
administration and intent of this Agreement unreasonably burdensome or destroy the intent of the parties hereto, in which case
this Agreement shall be terminated.
D.

The provision against assignment of this Agreement

shall not preclude the legal representatives of the estate of the
Employee from assigning any rights hereunder to the person or
persons entitled thereto under his will or, in the case of intestacy, to the person or persons entitled thereto under the laws of
intestacy applicable to his estate.
E.

This Agreement constitutes the sole understanding

of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof.
F.

Arbitration.

Any controversy or claim arising out

of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration in the City of Kanab in accordance with
the provisions of the American Arbitration Association.
9.

Governing Law.

This Agreement shall be governed by

and construed according to the laws of the State of Utah.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed
this Agreement as of the date and year first above written.

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.

its

P/Z/&/0&AS7-

M'ARC SMITH
EMPLOYEE
18.7

-8-
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EXHIBIT "A"

8UY SELL AGREEMENT
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.

THIS AGREEMENT made this

29th

day of

November

t

1986, by and between DONALD A. SAUNDERS, RONALD R- SMITH, MICHAEL
R. DENOYER, MARTIN M. MATHIS and MARC SMITH, (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Shareholders") and GRAND CANYON
EXPEDITIONS CO., a Utah corporation (hereinafter referred to as
the "Corporation") .
WHEREAS, the Shareholders will, upon issue, own ail of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Corporation, and
WHEREAS, the Shareholders desire to promote their mutual
interest and the interest of the Corporation by imposing certain
restrictions and obligations upon themselves, the Corporation and
on the shares of stock of the Corporation.
IT IS THEREFORE AGREED:
1.

Purchase of Stock.

Upon the death, cisaoility, cr

termination of employment with the Corporation, (either voluntarily or involuntarily), of any Shareholder, the Corporation
shall purchase and the individual Shareholder, or his estate,
shall sell, all of that individual's interest in the Corporation
now owned or hereinafter acquired.

The purchase price of the

stock shall he as set forth in paragraph 2 of this Agreement.

2.

Purchase Price.

The purchase price of each share

of stock will be determined as follows:
1.

The first year, net book value*

2. The second year, net book value
times one hundred ten percent
(110%) •
3. The third year, net book value
times one hundred twentv percent
(120%).
4. The fourth year, net book value
times one hundred thirty percent
(130%) .
5. The fifth year and beyond, net
book value times one hundred forty
percent (140% ) .
The determination of net book value shall be made by the
accountant servicing the Corporation and shall be made according
to generally accepted accounting principles.

Any such determina-

tion snail be conclusive on ail parties.
3.

Payment Date.

The purchase price shall be paid in

casn within sixty (60) days after any of the events set forth in
paragraph 1 and shall be paid as follows:
A. A down payment equal to thirty
percent (30%) of the purchase price
or the total amount of the remaining
obligation owed by the individual
Shareholder to Donald A. Saunders
for the purchase of the stock,
whichever is greater;
B. The oalance over six (6) years
at ten percent (10%) interest.
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4.

Delivery of Stock,

Upon the happening of any of

the events set forth in paragraph 1, the individual, or his
estate, snail immediately assign and deliver the shares of that
Sharenolder to the Corporation.

Such shares shall immediately be

designated as treasury stock on the books and records of the
Corporation; thereafter, Shareholder, or his estate, shall have
no further right or interest in the management or operation of
the Corporation and his sole claim against the Corporation shall
oe for the payment of the said shares pursuant to the terms of
this Agreement.
5.

Restrictions on Stock,

Mo Sharenolder shall dis-

pose of or encumber any part of his stock in the Corporation
unless all other Shareholders of the Corporation previously agree
in writing.

Any such attempted sale or encumbrance shall be void

and shall not be recognized by the Corporation for any purpose.
6.

Sale of Stock.

Anytime the Sharenolders of SIXTY

POUR PERCENT (64%) or more of the outstanding shares of stock in
the Corporation desire to sell their shares, they shall so notify
all of the remaining Shareholders in writing.

Such writing shall

set forth the sales price for the shares, any terms of sale, the
name and address of the proposed purchaser and shall contain a
representation that the offer to sell is bona fide and has tentatively been accepted by the proposed purchaser.

The writing

shall also contain an offer to the remaining Shareholders to
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RESIGNATION
I, MARC SMITH, hereby resign as Vice President/Director
of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. , effective the 15th day of July,
1992.
day of r

DATED this

/"<+/

/ 1992.

/Jk&L

MARiC/ SMITH
Vic,JA P r e s i dent/Director

STATE OF S3£H /%T'-^<-^

)
SS.

COUNTY OF <f'*C
thiS

, The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me
r* day of
YtJ/f . 1992, by MARC^SMITH.
J.^

?

rlJa KL . <-^>
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

// »
( u
v. A.( A'ft-vt//' / M * :

ryfs.

My Commission Expires:

g:\wpt\09S\0000Uvrt.WSl
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DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT

PETER STIRB A (Bar No. 3118)
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (BarNo. 4138)
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-8300

m THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARC SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v

SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS
CO., DONALD SAUNDERS,
MICHAEL DENOYER MARTIN
MATHIS,

Civil No. 940600003

Defendants.

Judge Kay McKiff

Plaintiff, by and through counsel of record, hereby complains against the above-named
Defendants and alleges for cause of action as follows:
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PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1.

Plaintiff Marc Smith is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, Utah.

2.

Defendant Grand Canyon Expedition Company, "Grand Canyon", is a Utah

corporation in good standing with its principal place of business in the city of Kanab, Kane County,
Utah.
3.

Defendant Donald Saunders, "Saunders", is an individual residing in King County,

Washington.
4.

Defendant Michael Denoyer, "Denoyer", is an individual residing in Kanab, Kane

County, Utah.
5.

Defendant Martin Mathis, "Mathis", is an individual residing in Kanab, Kane County,

6.

All of the acts complained of occurred in Salt Lake County and Kane County, Utah.

7.

Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis are shareholders and directors of

Utah.

Defendant Grand Canyon.
8.

Defendant Grand Canyon was incorporated on about November 24, 1986 and is in

the business of guiding river trips through the Grand Canyon. Defendant Grand Canyon is a
corporate successor to two corporations known as Ronald R. Smith Co., a Utah corporation, and
Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc., a Utah corporation.
9.

Witnesses and documentary evidence related to this case are more accessible and

available within the jurisdiction of this Court than they would be elsewhere. This is the most
convenient forum for trial of this action.
C:\MyFiles\SMTIH\amended.complaintBLRwpd
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10.

Defendant Saunders is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-27-22 et seq. inasmuch as he has transacted business in Kane County, Utah, has caused
injury in Kane County, Utah, and directly owns property located in Kane County, Utah.
11.

Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1997 as

amended).
12.

Venue is appropriate in this forum pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-13-4 and 7(1953

as amended).
BACKGROUND FACTS
13.

Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 12 above.

14.

Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc., predecessor to Defendant Grand Canyon, was

incorporated in or about 1964 and commenced doing business conducting guided river trips on the
Colorado River that same year.
15.

Plaintiff began working for Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. in or about 1966 and

became a full-time employee as a river guide and manager in 1973.
16.

Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. was owned solely by an individual named Ron Smith,

the Plaintiffs older brother.
17.

Plaintiff remained employed by Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. until it sold its assets

and business to Defendant Grand Canyon in November of 1986.
18.

During the 13 years of Plaintiff s full-time employment at Grand Canyon Expeditions,

Inc., he had gone from a guide running the river trips to managing all of the operations of Grand

C:\MyFiles\SMITH\amcnded.complaint.BLH.wpd
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Canyon Expeditions, Inc.'s business. Plaintiff never received any stock or participated in the equity
in any way of Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. prior to November of 1986.
19.

Some time prior to November of 1986, Plaintiffs older brother Ron Smith entered

into negotiations for the sale of Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc.'s assets to an entity controlled by
Defendant Saunders.
20.

In the course of the sale of the assets of Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. to the

Saunders-controlled entity, Defendant Grand Canyon was formed and incorporated, which entity
acquired all of the assets of the pre-existing business known as Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc.
including all park service river permits held by Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. and other entities.
21.

While conducting his due diligence prior to acquiring the assets of Grand Canyon

Expeditions, Inc., Defendant Saunders observed, among other things, Plaintiffs role in the operation
of Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc.'s business.
22.

Based on these observations, Defendant Saunders offered Plaintiff employment with

Defendant Grand Canyon and offered Plaintiff the opportunity to purchase a 17 percent interest in
the equity of Defendant Grand Canyon for the sum of $42,500.00.
23.

Plaintiff was also advised by Saunders that Defendants Denoyer and Mathis would

assume management positions in Defendant Grand Canyon.
24.

Upon receiving this offer, Plaintiff discussed with Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and

Mathis the fact that with Denoyer, Mathis and Plaintiff involved in management responsibilities at the
company, such a management team would make the company top heavy.

C:\MyFilcs\SMITO\amendcd.complaintBLH.wpd

4

210

25.

Defendant Saunders assured Plaintiff that Defendant Grand Canyon would soon make

further acquisitions of other river mnning operations which would make necessary the management
team proposed by Defendant Saunders.
26.

Defendant Saunders also proposed to loan Plaintiff $42,500.00 to purchase the stock

offered Plaintiff by Defendant Grand Canyon.
27.

Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis also represented to Plaintiff that the

employment commitment and the Plaintiffs equity participation in Defendant Grand Canyon would
be long term.
28.

Based upon these and other representations, Plaintiff agreed to be employed by

Defendant Grand Canyon in essentially the same position he had maintained prior to Defendant Grand
Canyon's acquisition of the business, and accepted the offer to purchase 17 percent of the equity of
Grand Canyon for $42,500.00. To facilitate this purchase, Plaintiff signed a promissory note to
Defendant Saunders in that amount.
29.

On November 29, 1986, Plaintiff executed a document styled "Employment

Agreement". A copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof.
30.

The November 29, 1986 Employment Agreement was for a specific term of 1 year

commencing January 1, 1987 and ending December 31, 1987. See Exhibit "A", ^ II. 1.A.
31.

While the employment period set forth in the November 29, 1986 Agreement was

never extended, renewed or amended in writing, Plaintiffs employment continued after December
31, 1987 without break until about July 15, 1992.
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32.

On about November 29, 1986, Plaintiff also executed a document styled "Buy-Sell

Agreement - Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.", referred to hereinafter as "Buy-Sell Agreement",
between he and Defendants Saunders, Denoyer, Mathis and Plaintiffs older brother Ronald R. Smith.
A copy of the Buy-Sell Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit UB" and made a part hereof.
33.

Among other things, the Buy-Sell Agreement provided a mechanism whereby the

purchase price of the stock of the participating shareholders would be acquired by either the
corporation or other shareholders, and provided that upon the termination of employment with the
corporation, (either voluntarily or involuntarily), of any shareholder, the corporation shall purchase
the individual shareholders]" stock. See Exhibit "B", 1f 1 and 2.
34.

By the time the acquisition by Defendant Grand Canyon of the predecessor corporate

entities' assets had closed, Defendant Saunders owned 28 percent of the stock of Defendant Grand
Canyon, Defendant Denoyer owned 28 percent, Defendant Mathis owned 17 percent, Plaintiff owned
17 percent, and Plaintiffs older brother Ron Smith owned 10 percent.
3 5.

Defendant Denoyer was made the president of Defendant Grand Canyon, Defendant

Mathis was made a vice president and Plaintiff was made a vice president for purposes of the
operation of the business of Defendant Grand Canyon.
36.

From virtually the outset of their management of the operations of Defendant Grand

Canyon in late November, early December of 1986, it was the Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and
Mathis' intention to learn all they could from the work performed by Plaintiff in the management of
the operations of the business, and once Defendants were comfortable with managing the operations
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of the business, they designed to terminate PlaintiflTs involvement as an employee and shareholder
in the enterprise.
37.

This intention was never explained or in any way made known to Plaintiff prior to,

during, or at anytime after the execution of his Employment Agreement and the Buy-Sell Agreement
in November of 1986.
38.

Commencing in December of 1986 and continuing thereafter, Defendant Grand

Canyon operated in much the same manner its corporate predecessors had been operated and
generated a profit in every succeeding year.
39.

In or about September of 1991, Defendant Grand Canyon acquired the assets of one

of its competitors operating on the Colorado River and in the Grand Canyon, Sobek/White Water,
Inc.
40.

It was anticipated that the Sobek/White Water, Inc. acquisition would increase

Defendant Grand Canyon's earning potential by approximately 50 percent, and substantially enhance
the Plaintiff and Defendants' equity holdings, which anticipation was figured by Defendant Don
Saunders and represented to Plaintiff.
41.

In connection with this acquisition, Plaintiff, together with Defendants Saunders,

Denoyer and Mathis were allowed to purchase additional shares of Defendant Grand Canyon.
Plaintiff agreed to purchase an additional seven-tenths of one percent (.7%) of the common shares
of Defendant Grand Canyon for $23,000.00, increasing its equity participation to 17.7 percent.
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42.

Defendant Saunders loaned Plaintiff $23,000.00 to pay Defendant Grand Canyon the

purchase price of this stock. Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis also acquired additional
shares of Defendant Grand Canyon at or about the same time.
43.

On about July 15, 1992, without any prior notice, warning, or intimation, Defendant

Denoyer as president of Defendant Grand Canyon discharged Plaintiff as an employee of the
corporation.
44.

Upon his termination, Plaintiff resigned as vice president/director of Defendant Grand

Canyon as of July 15, 1992.
45.

Defendants provided Plaintiff severance pay totaling one year's salary, and, citing

Plaintiffs termination of employment as its sole cause and basis for doing so, Defendant Grand
Canyon exercised the option to purchase Plaintiffs 17.7 percent equity interest in common shares of
Defendant Grand Canyon according to the terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement, for the gross amount
of $180,000.00.
46.

The decision to terminate Plaintiffs employment was made by Defendants Saunders,

Denoyer and Mathis, individually and as officers and directors of Defendant Grand Canyon without
prior consultation with or prior notice or warning to Plaintiff
47.

In determining the purchase price to be paid for Plaintiffs stock, according to the

terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement, Defendant Grand Canyon relied on the "net book value" which,
as a consequence of the Sobek/White Water, Inc. acquisition, on July 15, 1992, was substantially
lower and subject to liabilities unique and non-existent at any other point in time on the books and
records of Defendant Grand Canyon.
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48.

The fact that Defendant Grand Canyon had recently acquired Sobek/White Water,

Inc.' s assets and had incurred substantial liabilities for purposes of that acquisition severely diminished
the "net book value" of Defendant Grand Canyon in July of 1992.
49.

In about October of 1992, less than three months after Plaintiff had been terminated

and Defendant Grand Canyon had acquired his stock, Defendant Grand Canyon, by and through its
directors, Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis declared a dividend of approximately
$300,000.00.
50.

Based on Plaintiff s equity interest in Defendant Grand Canyon prior to his termination

and the acquisition of his stock, his proportional share of the dividend declared in October of 1992,
would have been approximately $52,500.00.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract Against Defendants Saunders, Denoyer, Mathis and Grand Canyon)
51.

Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 50 above.

52.

The representations of Defendant Saunders, the person who was ultimately in control

of Defendant Grand Canyon, made in or about November of 1986 and continuing thereafter that
Plaintiff would be a valued, permanent employee of Defendant Grand Canyon, coupled with his offer
to Plaintiff of approximately 17.7 percent equity interest in that corporation and his agreement to fund
Plaintiffs purchase of that interest, and his continued assurances of the long-term viability of the
business, created his and Defendant Grand Canyon's continuing agreement, supported by adequate
consideration, to provide employment and equity participation to Plaintiff in perpetuity, barring good
cause to the contrary.
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53.

The participation of Defendants Denoyer and Mathis in the representations of

Defendant Saunders, and their individual supportive representations and actions as officers and
directors of Defendant Grand Canyon created their individual agreements, and created an agreement
on behalf of Defendant Grand Canyon, supported by adequate consideration, for the continued
employment of PlaintifFby Defendant Grand Canyon and the continuation of PlaintifFs 17.7 percent
equity interest in the corporation, as PlaintifFs individual property in perpetuity, barring good cause
to the contrary.
54.

These representations and actions of Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis,

coupled with the course of dealing commencing in November of 1986 and continuing through July
of 1992, as the controlling shareholders and directors of Defendant Grand Canyon, created a binding
and on-going contract between Grand Canyon and Plaintiff pursuant to which Grand Canyon was
obligated to maintain its employment of Plaintiff, and allow him to persist in his ownership of 17.7
percent equity in that corporation in perpetuity, barring good cause to the contrary.
55.

Defendants Grand Canyon, Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis have breached their

continuing contracts with PlaintifFby, among other things, using their positions of control to force
the corporation to wrongfully terminate PlaintifFs employment without cause, prior notice or
warning, and, consequently, forcing the acquisition by Defendant Grand Canyon of PlaintifFs stock
pursuant to the Buy-Sell Agreement, at a time when the "net book value" was aberrationally low,
depriving Plaintiff of the economic benefit and potential for growth thereof
56.

As a direct consequence of the breaches referenced herein, and others, Plaintiff has

been damaged in an amount to be shown at trial including, but not limited to, the loss and potential
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for growth in participation in the business of Defendant Grand Canyon, the difference in value paid
for Plaintiffs stock in light of the aberrationaily low "net book value", together with the value of
Plaintiffs employment and benefits with Grand Canyon until a reasonable age of retirement.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)
57.

Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 56 above.

58.

At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was a dutiful employee of Defendant Grand

Canyon who more than fiilly and completely satisfied all of his employment obligations to the
Defendant Grand Canyon and who contributed to the smooth operation, success and profitability of
the Defendant Grand Canyon.
59.

Neither Grand Canyon nor any of the Defendants ever complained to Plaintiff in

writing, orally or otherwise that he was derelict in the performance of his responsibilities, that he was
not contributing to the operations, success and profitability of the Defendant Grand Canyon's
business or in any way was not satisfying his employment obligations to the Defendant Grand
Canyon.
60.

Plaintiff s Employment Agreement with Grand Canyon imposed on Grand Canyon and

its agents a covenant or duty of good faith and fair dealing in its relationship and in the performance
of its contractual obligations to Plaintiff.
61.

Similarly, the Buy-Sell Agreement by and between Plaintiff and Defendants imposes

on all the Defendants a covenant or duty of good faith and fair dealing in making provision for the
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acquisition by the Company or other shareholders of Plaintiff s stock triggered by the termination of
Plaintiffs employment.
62.

Defendants breached their covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in Plaintiff s

employment agreement by terminating him without cause and without prior notice or warning in
accordance with their designs on July 15, 1992.
63.

Defendants breached their covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in Plaintiff s

Employment Agreement by not disclosing to him in November of 1986 that it was their intention to
learn all they could from the operation of the business of Defendant Grand Canyon, and at such time
as Defendants felt comfortable operating the business on their own, to terminate Plaintiff.
64.

Defendants further breached their covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in

the Buy-Sell Agreement by effectuating their desigr

^ing the Plaintiff on July 15, 1992 at

a point in time when the "net book value" of T

iiyon was aberrationally low as a

consequence of the Sobek/White Water.

J by effectively depriving Plaintiff of

participating in the anticipated annu

992 and the consequential dividend of

$300,000.00.
65.

As a direct, foreseeable and contemplated consequence of the Defendants' breach of

their covenant of good faith and fair dealing to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has sustained general and
consequential damages in an amount to be shown at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff hereby respectfully requests this matter be tried to a jury.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants as follows:
1.

Against the Defendants Grand Canyon, Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis and each of

them, jointly and severally, shown at trial; in an amount to compensate Plaintiff for the difference in
value of his stock in July, 1992 and its value had it been sold calculating "net book value" not
including the Sobek/White Water, Inc. Acquisition debt, plus the value of Plaintiff s continued
employment at Grand Canyon until retirement plus benefits, together with the PlaintifFs portion of
the 1992 annual dividend; and,
2.

Against Defendants Grand Canyon, Saunders, Denoyer, Mathis, and each of them

jointly and severally to compensate Plaintiff for sustaining general and consequential damages on
Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and,
3.

Punitive damages shown at trial against all the Defendants for their breaches of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the wrongful termination of Plaintiff and forced
the sale of his stock in July of 1992; and,
4.

Costs and attorney's fees incurred herein; and,

5.

Any other relief the Court deems just.
DATED this '7^1

day of June, 1998.
STIRB A & HATHAWAY

PETER STIRBA
BENSON L. HATHAWAY^ JR.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -Q^kday of June, 1998,1 caused to be served a true copy
of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, by the method indicated below, to the
following:
John A. Anderson
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Defendants
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Ut 84145
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( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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BUY SELL AGREEMENT
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.

THIS AGREEMENT made this

29th

day of

November

#

1986, by and between DONALD A. SAUNDERS, RONALD R. SMITH, MICHAEL
R. DENOYER, MARTIN M. MATHIS and MARC SMITH, (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Shareholders") and GRAND CANYON
EXPEDITIONS CO., a Utah corporation (hereinafter referred to as
the "Corporation").
WHEREAS, the Shareholders will, upon issue, own all of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Corporation, and
WHEREAS, the Shareholders desire to promote their mutual
interest and the interest of the Corporation by imposing certain
restrictions and obligations upon themselves, the Corporation and
on the shares of stock of the Corporation.
IT IS THEREFORE AGREED:
1.

Purchase of Stock.

Upon the death, disability, or

termination of employment with the Corporation, (either voluntarily or involuntarily), of any Shareholder, the Corporation
shall purchase and the individual Shareholder, or his estate,
shall sell, all of that individual's interest in the Corporation
now owned or hereinafter acquired.

The purchase price of the

stock shall be as set forth in paragraph 2 of this Agreement.
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2.

Purchase Price.

The purchase price of each share

of stock will be determined as follows:
1.

The first year, net book value.

2. The second year, net book value
times one hundred ten percent
(110%).
3. The third year, net book value
times one hundred twenty percent
(120%).
4. The fourth year, net book value
times one hundred thirty percent
(130%).
5. The fifth year and beyond, net
book value times one hundred forty
percent ( 140% ) .
The determination of net book value shall be made by the accountant servicing the Corporation and shall be made according
to generally accepted accounting principles.

Any such determina-

tion shall be conclusive on all parties.
3.

Payment Date.

The purchase price shall be paid in

cash within sixty (60) days after any of the events set forth in
paragraph 1 and shall be paid as follows:
A. A down payment equal to thirty
percent (30%) of the purchase price
or the total amount of the remaining
obligation owed by the individual
Shareholder to Donald A. Saunders
for the purchase of the stock,
whichever is greater;
B. The balance over six (6) years
at ten percent (10%) interest.
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4.

Delivery of Stock.

Upon the happening of any of

the events set forth in paragraph 1, the individual, or his
estate, shall immediately assign and deliver the shares of that
Shareholder to the Corporation.

Such shares shall immediately be

designated as treasury stock on the books and records of the
Corporation; thereafter, Shareholder, or his estate, shall have
no further right or interest in the management or operation of
the Corporation and his sole claim against the Corporation shall
be for the payment of the said shares pursuant to the terms of
this Agreement,
5.

Restrictions on Stock.

No Shareholder shall dis-

pose of or encumber any part of his stock in the Corporation
unless all other Shareholders of the Corporation previously agree
in writing.

Any such attempted sale or encumbrance shall be void

and shall not be recognized by the Corporation for any purpose.
6.

Sale of Stock.

Anytime the Shareholders of SIXTY

FOUR PERCENT (64%) or more of the outstanding shares of stock in
the Corporation desire to sell their shares, they shall so notify
all of the remaining Shareholders in writing.

Such writing shall

set forth the sales price for the shares, any terms of sale, the
name and address of the proposed purchaser and shall contain a
representation that the offer to sell is bona fide and has tentatively been accepted by the proposed purchaser.

The writing

shall also contain an offer to the remaining Shareholders to
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8.

Term*

This Agreement shall terminate upon the

occurrence of any of the following events:
A. Cessation of the Corporation's
business;
B. Bankruptcy, receivership or
dissolution of the Corporation;
C. Whenever there is only one (1)
surviving Shareholder bound by the
terms hereof;
D. The voluntary agreement of all
parties who are bound by the terms
of this Agreement.
E. The sale of ONE HUNDRED PERCENT
(100%) of the shares of the
Corporat ion.
Upon the termination of this Agreement, each Shareholder
shall surrender to the Corporation, certificates for his stock,
the Corporation shall issue to him in lieu thereof new certificates for an equal number of shares without the endorsement set
forth in paragraph 6.
9.

Exclusions*

Donald A. Saunders and Ronald R. Smith

shall be exempt from the requirement of employment set forth in
paragraph 1 and the failure of either or both, to be employed by
the Corporation shall not require them to sell, nor the
Corporation to purchase, their shares of stock.
^

#

Benefit.

This Agreement shall be binding upon the

Shareholders, their heirs, legal representatives, successors or
assigns and upon the Corporation, its successors or assigns.

The
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sell, for a period of not less than SIX (6) months, the subject
shares upon the same terms and conditions offered to the prospective purchase.

If the remaining Shareholders do not accept

the offer to sell within the SIX (6) month period, all of the
Shareholders shall immediately thereafter sell all of their
shares in the corporation to the proposed purchasers upon the
terms and conditions at the price set forth in the notice.

If

the sale to the proposed purchaser has not closed within NINE (9)
months from the date of the notice of intent to sell, such offer
to sell shall lapse and any sale thereafter must comply anew with
the provisions of this paragraph,
7,

Endorsement on Stock Certificates,

Upon the

execution of this Agreement the Certificates of Stock subject
hereto shall be endorsed as follows:
"This certificate is transferable
only upon compliance with the
provisions of an Agreement dated the
29th day of November, 1986, among
DONALD A. SAUNDERS, RONALD R. SMITH,
MICHAEL R. DENOYERf MARTIN M,
MATHIS, MARC SMITH and GRAND CANYON
EXPEDITIONS CO,, a copy of which is
on file in the office of the
Secretary of the Corporation,"
After endorsement the certificate shall be issued to the
Shareholder, who shall, subject to the terms of this Agreement,
be entitled to exercise all rights of ownership in such stock.
All stock hereinafter issued by the Company shall bear a similar
endorsement.
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executor, administrator or personal representative of a deceased
Shareholder shall execute and deliver any and all documents or
legal instruments necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Agreement.
11.

Miscellaneous*

This Agreement shall be governed by

the laws of the State of Utah,
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed
this Agreement the day and year first above written.

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS COBy

/xtddi?. 4 * ^
MICHAEL R.

I

pas****

DENOYER,*'Pr esident

ATTEST:

/MLO
#J).
MICHAEL R. DENOYER'
4**&.

f[ARC S

_^2_

i^ONALD R. SMITH

18.11
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT dated the

2-f '

da

Y of

t]/^/e,^J^.r

1986f is entered into by and between Marc Smith, (hereinafter
referred to as "Employee") and Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.,
(hereinafter referred to as "Expeditions").

I.
A.

RECITALS

Expeditions is engaged in the business of promoting

and running raft trips in the Grand Canyon, Arizona.
B.

It is essential for the full protection of the

business of Expeditions (hereinafter referred to as the
"Employer"), and its employees engaged in such businesses, that
the employees should not disclose confidential or other vital
information regarding such business with which they have or may
become acquainted during the period of their employment.

Without

such protection, it would not be practical to expose Employee to
work being done by Employer and its employees, nor to bring
Employee into free and open relationships with other employees of
Employer who are possessed of such proprietary information,

II.

AGREEMENT

Therefore, it is agreed as follows:
1.

Terms of Employment.

Terms of Employment of
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Employee by Expeditions, including Employment Period, are as
follows:
A

*

Employment Period.

Expeditions agrees to

employ Employee, and Employee agrees to remain in the
employ of Expeditions during the period (the "Employment
Period") beginning on the 1st day of January, 1987, and
ending on he 31st day of December, 1987.

During the

Employment Period, the Employee shall perform such
duties for Expeditions as he may be reasonably requested
to do, relating to its business.

At the request of

Expeditions this Agreement and the Employment Period may
be extended by the mutual consent of Employee and
Expeditions.
B.

Performance of Duties.

Expeditions and

Employee agree that during the Employment Period,
Employee shall devote his business time to the business
affairs of Expeditions and its affiliated companies.
Employee's responsibilities to Expeditions and its
affiliated companies shall be substantially comparable
to the duties he performed for other companies immediately prior to the date hereof or as mutually agreed.
C.

Compensat ion.

Subject to the terms and condi-

tions of this Employment Agreement, Employee shall be
compensated as follows:
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1.

For the 12 consecutive-month period

commencing on the first day January 1987,
Employee shall receive, in substantially equal
monthly or more frequent installments, a basic
annual salary of $ ZhGCC

^

The basic

salary payable during any extension of the
Employment Period shall be by mutual agreement
of the parties.
2.

Employee shall be entitled to parti-

cipate in a bonus plan to be established and
to be known as The Grand Canyon Expeditions
Co. Key Personnel Bonus Plan.
be

Said Plan will

based on a percentage of pre federal in-

come tax net profit and substantially in the
form attached hereto as Attachment A.
3.

Either Employee or Expeditions may

terminate Employee*s employment at any time,
with or without cause.

Expedition's obliga-

tion to pay Employee in accordance with the
provisions of subparagraph 1 next above shall
cease as of the date of Employee's termination
of employment with Expeditions, if such termination is on account of Employee's death, disability, voluntary resignation or on account
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of his dismissal for cause.

If Employee's

employment with Expeditions terminates for any
other reason, Expedition's obligation to pay
Employee in accordance with subparagraph 1
next above shall continue for the remainder of
the Employment Period, or, if earlier, until
the date of his death, as though he were
employed during that period,
4.

If Employee's employment is termi-

nated on account of Employee's death, disability, or dismissal by Expeditions without
cause, then Employee shall be entitled to
receive, prorated for the applicable one year
period based upon the period of employment
preceding such termination, benefits under
Attachment A.
5-

Employee shall be entitled to the

same pension, retirement, medical, insurance,
customary holidays, and other fringe benefits
as shall be made available to management employees of Expeditions.
2.

Non-Compet it ion.

During the Employment Period and

during the two years after the end of the Employment Period, or
any extensions thereof, Employee shall not:
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a.

Own (directly or indirectly) f work for or

act as a consultant for, or serve as a director, officer
or principal of, any business (except for the Employer
or an affiliated company) which engages (as a major line
of business) in, or
b.

Intentionally assist any business (except

for the Employer or an affiliated company) in the establishment or operation of, the business of promoting and
running rafting trips in the Grand Canyon, Arizona,
3-

Successors.

In the event that Expeditions shall at

any time be merged or consolidated with or into any other corporation or corporations or shall sell or otherwise transfer substantially all of its assets to another corporation, the provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit of the consolidated Corporation

or to the Corporation

which such assets shall be sold or transferred,
4.

Ass igns.

Except as provided in the preceding para-

graph, this Agreement may not be assigned by either Expeditions
or Employee,
5#

Notices,

Any notice or communication required by

or permitted to be given in connection with this Agreement shall
be in writing and shall be delivered in person, sent by prepaid
telegram and followed with a confirming letter, or mailed by
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certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to Employee at such address as he may rom time to time
select and to Expeditions at:
Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.
P. 0. Box 0
Kanab, Utah 84741
6.

General Provisions.

The following general terms

and provisions shall apply:
A.

No amendment or modification of this Agreement

shall be deemed effective unless executed in writing by both
parties hereto.
B.

No term or condition of this Agreement shall be

deemed to have been waived, nor shall there be any estoppel to
enforce any provision of this Agreement, except by written
instrument executed by the party charged with such waiver or
estoppel.

Any written waiver shall not be deemed a continuing

waiver unless specifically stated, shall operate only as to the
specific term or condition waived and shall not constitute a
waiver of such term or condition for the future or as to any act
other than that specifically waived.
C.

If any part, term or provision of this Agreement is

held by the courts to be unenforceable, illegal or in conflict
with any federal, state or local laws, such part, term or provision shall be considered severable from the rest of the Agree-
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ment.

The remaining portions of the Agreement shall not be af-

fected, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be
construed and inferred as if the Agreement did not contain the
particular term, part or provision held to be invalid, unless the
invalid provisions, when considered in the aggregate, render the
administration and intent of this Agreement unreasonably burdensome or destroy the intent of the parties hereto, in which case
this Agreement shall be terminated.
D.

The provision against assignment of this Agreement

shall not preclude the legal representatives of the estate of the
Employee from assigning any rights hereunder to the person or
persons entitled thereto under his will or, in the case of intestacy, to the person or persons entitled thereto under the laws of
intestacy applicable to his estate.
E.

This Agreement constitutes the sole understanding

of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof.
F.

Arbitrat ion.

Any controversy or claim arising out

of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration in the City of Kanab in accordance with
the provisions of the American Arbitration Association.
9.

Governing Law.

This Agreement shall be governed by

and construed according to the laws of the State of Utah.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed
this Agreement as of the date and year first above written.

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.

BY /fajLrf
Its

7?

SyfA^

/?j?£?/0&A^t-

ui
MARC SMITH
EMPLOYEE

18.7
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ATTACHMENT "A"

GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.
KEY PERSONNEL BONUS PLAN
!•

Purpose,

Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. (hereinafter

referred to as the "Company") has established The Grand Canyon
Expeditions Co., Key Personnel Bonus Plan as set forth herein
(hereinafter referred to as the "Plan") to aid the Company in
attracting, rewarding and retaining well-qualified key personnel
and to further the identity of interests of such personnel with
the interests of the Company's shareholder.
2.

Admin istrat ion.

The authority to manage and

control the operation and administration of the Plan, the power
to grant Annual Incentive Awards (as described in paragraph 4 ) ,
the authority to establish terms, conditions and limitations on
Annual Incentive Awards and the authority to determine whether
Performance Targets (as described in paragraph 4) have been met
shall be vested in the Company's Board of Directors (hereinafter
referred to as the "Board").

The Board shall act by a majority

of its then members by meeting or by a writing filed without
meeting.

Any interpretation of the Plan and any decision on any

other matter within the discretion of the Board made by the Board
in good faith is final and binding on all persons.

No member of

the Board shall be liable for any action or determination made in
good faith with respect to the Plan.
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3«

Participation,.

The Board shall designate the key

employees of the Company who shall be eligible to receive Annual
Incentive Awards for any calendar year (hereinafter referred to
as the "Participants").
4.

Annual Incentive Awards.

Commencing with the year

ending the 31st day of December, 1987, and ending in the year
that the debt of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., to Ronald Smith
and Donald A. Saunders is paid in full, a bonus pool of twentytwo percent (22%) of the pre federal tax income of the Company
will be divided between key personnel as directed by the Board.
After the payment of the debt to Ronald Smith and Donald A.
Saunders the percent shall be increased to thirty-five percent
(35%).
5.

Termination of Employment.

If a Participant's

employment is terminated by the Company without cause or is
terminated by reason of death or disability, the Participant or,
in the event of death, his estate, shall be entitled to a portion
of the bonus which he would otherwise have received for the year
in which such termination occurs, pro rated according to the
portion of the calendar year which elapsed prior to the
termination of employment.

The Board shall make such equitable

adjustments as it deems appropriate with respect to individual
Performance Targets for a Participant whose employment is so
terminated.

Such portion shall be paid at the time that the
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Participant would have received the bonus, if his employment had
not terminated.

Except as provided above in this paragraph 5, or

as otherwise provided by the Board, no bonus shall be payable for
any year to a Participant whose employment terminates prior to
the end of that year.
6.

Withholding of Taxes.

Payment of any Incentive

Award in accordance with the terms of the award shall be subject
to the withholding of all applicable federal and states taxes.
7.

Interests Not Transferable.

Except for amounts, if

any, owing to Expeitions, the interest of Participants under the
Plan are not subject to the claims of their respective creditors,
if any, and may not be voluntarily or involuntarily assigned,
alienated or encumbered.
8.

Amendment and Termination.

The Company reserves

the right to amend or terminate the Plan at any time by
resolution of the Board.
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